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ARTICLES 
 
Democracy and Criminal Discovery 
Reform After Connick and Garcetti 
Janet Moore†  
INTRODUCTION 
The nondisclosure of information beneficial to criminal 
defendants causes wrongful convictions, wasteful litigation, 
and uncertainty in criminal adjudications.1 Prosecutors are 
required to disclose this information under Brady v. Maryland2 
and related cases,3 criminal discovery rules,4 and codes of 
  
 † Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. E-
mail: janet.moore@uc.edu. I thank Deans Erwin Chemerinsky and Lou Bilionis, 
Professors Bob Mosteller, Mark Godsey, R. Michael Cassidy, Ron Wright, Margaret 
Tarkington, Jennifer Laurin, Daniel Medwed, Jack Chen, and faculty participants in 
the College of Law’s Summer Workshop for very helpful responses to drafts of this 
Article. Catherine Sakla, Lindsey Fleissner, Krista Johnson, and Anthony Robertson 
provided outstanding research assistance. All errors are my own. As relevant to full 
disclosure, my experience includes indigent capital defense litigation on Brady claims, 
and criminal justice reform research and advocacy as a Soros Senior Justice Advocacy 
Fellow, member of the Ohio Public Defender Commission, and Director of the Race and 
Justice Project at the Ohio Justice & Policy Center. 
 1 Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 96 & tbl.5 
(2008); Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction 
Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 69-70 & n.173 (documenting cases); Peter A. Joy, The 
Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping 
Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 403-04 (citing studies); Emily M. 
West, Innocence Project, Court Findings of Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims in Post-
Conviction Appeals and Civil Suits Among the First 255 DNA Exoneration Cases 1 & n.1 
(2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Innocence_Project_Pros_ 
Misconduct.pdf (citing studies); id. at 4-11 (sampling cases); N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS 7-9, 19-44 (2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/ 
TaskForceonWrongfulConvictions/FinalWrongfulConvictionsReport.pdf. 
 2 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 3 See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1995); United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679 (1985); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959); Berger 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, reh’g 
denied, 294 U.S. 732 (1935). 
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professional ethics.5 But two recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions, Connick v. Thompson6 and Garcetti v. Ceballos,7 
underscore the weak enforceability of Brady-line authorities as 
mechanisms for criminal discovery reform. The cases also point 
out the contrasting fairness and efficiency of full open file 
discovery8 as an alternative reform model. 
Connick arose after John Thompson spent eighteen years 
behind bars. For fourteen of those years, Thompson was on 
twenty-three-hour-a-day solitary confinement in a six-by-nine 
foot windowless death row cell at Angola Prison.9 A few weeks 
before his scheduled execution, a last-ditch defense investigation 
revealed what the Louisiana Court of Appeal described as the 
prosecutors’ “intentional hiding of exculpatory evidence.”10 This 
new information led to Thompson’s release.11 He then filed a 
federal civil rights action.12 The federal jury awarded him $14 
million in compensation for his wrongful imprisonment.13 The 
  
 4 See, e.g., Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek 
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1379, 1417 & n.206 (2000) (citing discovery rule provisions).  
 5 Of the abundant literature on the inadequacy of disciplinary codes to 
regulate prosecutorial discovery violations, see Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s 
Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 282-96 (2008); 
Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1593-94; 
Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute 
Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 516-20 (2011); Kevin C. McMunigal, 
The (Lack of) Enforcement of Prosecutor Disclosure Rules, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 
848-49 (2010); Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the 
Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 264-85 (2008); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions 
Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 716-31 
(1987); Ellen Yaroshevsky, Wrongful Conviction: It Is Time to Take Prosecutor 
Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. REV. 275, 276-77 (2004); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. 
Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the 
Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11-13, 58-59 (2009). But see id. at 5-11 
(arguing that prosecutors “rarely deserve exclusive or primary blame for the conviction 
of innocent defendants” and urging more nuanced assessment of prosecutor’s role); 
Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2127-37 (2010) 
(arguing that the shift away from fault-based rhetoric encourages prosecutorial 
cooperation with administrative reform). 
 6 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 7 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-903 to -910 (2012); id. § 15A-1415(f); see Mosteller, 
supra note 5, at 307-16 (discussing fairness and efficiency enhancements under full 
open file discovery statutes). 
 9 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355; Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 842-43, 
865 (5th Cir. 2008), aff’d by divided en banc opinion, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009), 
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 10 State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 557 (La. Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied, 
829 So. 2d 427 (La. 2002) (reversing order denying Thompson a new trial). 
 11 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 1355-56. 
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jury found that Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick 
had been deliberately indifferent toward the need to train line 
prosecutors on their Brady discovery duties.14  
By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court ordered 
Thompson’s award vacated and sharply restricted 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 as an avenue for enforcing prosecutors’ constitutional 
disclosure duties.15 The Court had previously held individual 
prosecutors immune from personal liability for failing to 
conduct Brady training.16 Connick effectively immunizes 
municipalities for those failures, eliminating the taxpaying and 
voting public as a meaningful resource to compensate and deter 
Brady violations. Writing for the dissent, Justice Ginsburg 
cautioned that “prosecutorial concealment . . . is bound to be 
repeated unless municipal agencies bear responsibility—made 
tangible by § 1983 liability.”17  
Connick illustrates the subordination of Brady 
enforcement to other interests—here, a concern to limit 
municipal liability, even when government employees confess to 
intentional misconduct. Connick also highlights a similar 
subordination of Brady enforcement by the same five-member 
Supreme Court majority in Garcetti v. Ceballos.18 Richard 
Ceballos’s civil rights case was in some respects the mirror image 
of John Thompson’s. Ceballos was not a criminal defendant. He 
was a Los Angeles prosecutor. He alleged that his supervisors 
unconstitutionally retaliated against him not for withholding 
beneficial information from the accused but for bringing such 
evidence to light.19 In Garcetti, the majority held that the First 
Amendment provides no protection against such retaliation.20 
Connick was promptly condemned for restricting 42 
U.S.C § 1983 as an avenue for enforcing Brady.21 But scholars 
  
 14 Id. at 1356. 
 15 Id. at 1356, 1366.  
 16 Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 338-39 (2009). For a historical 
critique of prosecutorial immunity doctrines in the civil rights setting, see Johns, supra 
note 5, at 521-27. On the minimal utility of enforcing personal liability under section 
1983, see Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in 
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 29-32 (2000). 
 17 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 18 See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 19 Id. at 416, 421-22. 
 20 Id. at 426. 
 21 See, e.g., Justice John Paul Stevens, Remarks at Equal Justice Initiative 
Dinner (May 2, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/stevens.pdf; Susan 
A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A 
Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (2011); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Head in the Sand on Prosecutorial Misconduct, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 25, 2011), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202491215314&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1. 
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have not unpacked Garcetti’s full significance on that point. In 
part, this neglect is understandable. With few exceptions,22 
Garcetti has been analyzed on its terms, as clarifying First 
Amendment doctrine regarding government employee speech.23 
Closer analysis reveals a previously unremarked due process 
shield that should have protected Richard Ceballos from 
retaliation for Brady compliance. At a deeper level, the silence 
on Garcetti’s implications for constitutional criminal discovery is 
emblematic of the short shrift often accorded to the enforcement 
of prosecutors’ constitutional discovery obligations.  
Taken together, the two cases neatly illustrate Brady’s 
weak enforceability. By effectively eliminating municipal 
liability even when prosecutors deliberately suppress evidence, 
Connick gives a wink-and-nod to nondisclosure.24 By limiting 
section 1983 protection against retaliation for good faith 
compliance with discovery duties, Garcetti sends a chilling 
message that prosecutors may be damned if they do disclose 
beneficial evidence to the defense. By landing this one-two 
punch against enforceability of Brady-line duties, Connick and 
Garcetti invite a contrast with full open file discovery statutes 
as the optimal strategy for increasing the fairness, finality, and 
efficiency of criminal adjudications. 
Among discovery reform statutes, North Carolina’s are 
the most expansive in the nation. They mandate the 
prosecution’s disclosure to the defense of all information 
obtained in a criminal investigation.25 They require recordation 
of oral statements26 and impose criminal penalties for willful 
  
 22 Margaret Tarkington, Government Speech and the Publicly Employed 
Attorney, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2175, 2178-89 & nn.13, 46-57 (addressing due process 
disclosure implications of Garcetti and responding to Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging 
First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008)). 
 23 See id. at 2176 & n.5 (citing scholarly commentary). 
 24 Connick’s wink-and-nod was not undone by the terse majority opinion 
granting Brady relief in the Orleans Parish case of Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630-31 
(2012), nor by the remarkable suggestion during oral argument that the prosecutor 
consider forfeiting the case. See Lyle Denniston, Disaster at the Lectern, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Nov. 8, 2011, 4:51 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=131456. The governing doctrine 
invited diverse views on the materiality of the undisclosed evidence, as was demonstrated 
by Justice Thomas’s close analysis of the evidence, Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 631-41 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting), by the state trial judge who rejected Smith’s Brady claim on the merits 
after hearing witness testimony over the course of four days, Respondent’s Brief at 20, 
Smith, 132 S. Ct. 627 (No. 10-8145), and by the numerous Louisiana appellate judges who 
voted (apparently unanimously) to deny Smith’s petitions for discretionary review, see id. 
and State v. Smith, 45 So. 3d 1065 (La. 2010). For discussion of the practical and 
doctrinal problems that lead to such disparate assessments of Brady-line duties, see infra 
Part II.  
 25 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1)(a) (2012). 
 26 Id. § 15A-903(a)(1)(c). 
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violations.27 Available empirical evidence shows significant 
success in the statutes’ implementation and expansion, yet full 
open file discovery remains a rarity in the United States.28 And 
like the precise due process disclosure duty at issue in Garcetti, 
this cutting-edge development in criminal procedure has 
received scant scholarly attention.  
The silence may result in part from a trend, expressed in 
Marc Miller and Ronald Wright’s The Black Box,29 which 
privileges internal bureaucratic improvement over litigation and 
legislation as the only effective avenue toward criminal justice 
reform—at least with respect to prosecutors’ discretionary 
decision making. Full open file discovery reform bolsters 
skepticism toward that trend. Dogged case investigation and 
litigation raised the profile of criminal discovery issues for the 
public, the media, and key legislators. Increased public scrutiny 
led to hard-fought political compromises in the enactment and 
amendment of the reform statutes. 
Full open file reform vindicates law and politics as 
effective strategies—complementary to internal agency 
reform—for increasing transparency and accountability in 
prosecutorial decision making. Broader attention and closer 
study, ideally through the full open file statutes’ evaluation as 
a model for uniform legislation, should raise discovery reform 
to parity with other criminal procedure reforms. Comparable 
initiatives include improvements in eyewitness identification 
protocols, in the testing and retention of forensic evidence, and 
in interrogation methods.30 This article fills an important 
analytical gap by focusing closely on the litigation and 
legislation that drove full open file discovery reform, and by 
proposing that the Connick-Garcetti one-two punch against 
enforcing discovery duties can and should energize nationwide 
efforts to obtain full open file reform. 
  
 27 Id. § 15A-903(d).  
 28 For examples of other relatively broad criminal discovery provisions, see 
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01 (2010); N.J. COURT R. 3:13-3(a)-(c) (2011).  
 29 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 
128-30 (2008). 
 30 See, e.g., UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT 
(2010), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/erci/2010final.htm; David 
Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1027, 1046-47 & nn.136-38 (2010) (citing examples of reform legislation in Illinois 
and Wisconsin); Sub. S.B. 77, 128th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2009) (establishing DNA 
database, requiring recordation of interrogations, and revising eyewitness 
identification procedures by enacting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.561, 2933.81-83, 
2953.56-60 and amending id. §§ 109.573, 2901.07, 2953.21, 2953.23, 2953.31, 2953.32, 
2953.321, 2953.35, 2953.51, 2953.54, 2953.55, 2953.71-79, 2953.81, 2953.83, 2953.84). 
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Parts I and II set the stage for in-depth examinations of 
Connick and Garcetti as examples of Brady’s weak 
enforceability and for discussion of the litigation and legislation 
that generated the full open file reform alternative. Part I 
excavates the roots of due process discovery doctrine to identify 
core meanings and principles. Part II summarizes intractable 
doctrinal and practical problems that weaken enforceability of 
constitutional criminal discovery rights and duties. Part III 
examines Connick and Garcetti as recent exemplars of those 
problems. Part IV contrasts Connick and Garcetti as examples of 
the Brady regime’s complexity and costs with the simplicity and 
efficiency of full open file discovery. This part surveys reported 
case law, available legislative history, and observations from some 
frontline participants as the most readily accessible evidence of 
full open file discovery’s implementation and expansion.  
Forthcoming research identifies conditions that enable 
such reform in some jurisdictions and impede it in others. But 
the story of full open file discovery reform recasts the core lesson 
of Connick and Garcetti. The cases need not reinforce despair of 
litigation and legislation as strategies for sustainable system 
improvement. They can introduce a new chapter in a broader 
reform story. Their holdings underscore Brady’s weak 
enforceability and its intolerable results in wasted lives, 
tramped liberty, and squandered criminal justice resources. 
Connick and Garcetti should motivate broad adoption of full 
open file discovery statutes as a prerequisite—a necessary, 
although not sufficient condition—for improving efficiency, 
fairness, and finality in the resolution of criminal cases.  
I. DUE PROCESS DISCLOSURE DUTIES  
Brady doctrine requires prosecutors to disclose certain 
beneficial information to the defense.31 It is helpful to excavate 
the historical roots of these duties, if only to counteract 
shorthand citations that elide or misstate core principles and 
holdings of Brady-line cases.32 Due process discovery duties are 
  
 31 Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012). 
 32 See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1378-82 (2011) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (citing Orleans Parish prosecutors’ admitted ignorance of core Brady-
line discovery duties); see also Cookie Ridolfi, New Perspectives on Brady and Other 
Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices: External 
Regulation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2030 n.83 (2010) (distinguishing Brady duties 
from ethics rules on the basis that the latter require no defense request to trigger 
disclosure duty); but see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (eliminating 
defense request requirement from due process discovery doctrine). In designing and 
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grounded in the prosecutorial mandate to speak truth33 and 
seek justice.34 The duties encompass two types of evidence. The 
first tends to reduce the defendant’s culpability with respect to 
guilt or sentencing.35 Examples include witness statements 
that corroborate an alibi defense.36 The second category 
comprises impeachment evidence. A deal between a witness 
and a prosecutor to exchange testimony for leniency on a 
pending charge, for example, may support an inference that the 
witness is less credible due to pro-prosecution bias.37 
The history of due process discovery doctrine also 
reveals a handful of principles through which the core 
meanings of truth-speaking and justice-seeking are to be 
implemented. For example, there is no mens rea element in a 
Brady claim. Prosecutors must disclose favorable evidence 
whether or not defense counsel requests it.38 Defendants need 
not prove prosecutors’ acts or omissions were undertaken 
intentionally or in bad faith.39 Another core principle requires 
cumulative prejudice review. Courts must assess harm from 
nondisclosure by reviewing the strength and weakness of all 
evidence presented by both parties at trial and in 
postconviction proceedings.40  
These core principles of Brady doctrine began to emerge 
in 1935, when Thomas Mooney obtained Supreme Court review 
of his capital murder case.41 Mooney was a workers’ rights 
activist. He was sentenced to death in 1917 for a San Francisco 
bombing that killed ten people.42 Mooney fought his conviction 
for eighteen years before the Supreme Court accepted his 
petition for federal habeas review. In Mooney v. Holohan, the 
Court held—for the first time—that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids prosecutors from 
  
implementing training programs for defense counsel, I have often found comparable 
misunderstanding or misstatement of criminal discovery rights and duties. 
 33 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959). 
 34 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 35 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POST-
INVESTIGATION 425 (2d ed. 2009).  
 36 Id.  
 37 For thoughtful analysis of the duty to disclose impeachment evidence, see 
R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of 
Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1431 (2011). 
 38 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
 39 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 40 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439-40 (1995). 
 41 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam). 
 42 Lori A. Ringhand, Aliens on the Bench: Lessons in Identity, Race and 
Politics from the First “Modern” Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing to Today, 2010 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 795, 805 & n.56. 
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obtaining convictions through the knowing use of perjured 
testimony.43 The constitutional values at issue were fairness 
and reliability in contests between concentrated government 
power and the individual.44 
A few months later, the Court decided Berger v. United 
States.45 This mine-run counterfeiting case contains oft-cited 
descriptions of the prosecution’s unique purpose and power and 
the corresponding primacy of prosecutors’ duties to speak truth 
and seek justice. Under Berger, the prosecutor is a minister of 
government and “servant of the law.”46 The prosecution’s 
interest “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done.”47 The prosecution must ensure that “guilt shall not 
escape nor innocence suffer.”48 It is as much the prosecutor’s 
duty “to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to 
bring about a just one.”49 This is so, the Court reasoned, 
because the fact finder in a criminal case reasonably expects 
the prosecutor to abide by the foregoing high principles. 
Therefore, evidence and arguments bearing a prosecutor’s 
imprimatur weigh strongly against the defendant.50  
In a key doctrinal development, the Berger Court 
assessed prejudice cumulatively. Berger alleged that the 
prosecutor in his case had violated his due process rights in 
several ways. Instead of addressing each allegation piecemeal, 
the Court held that the prosecutor’s misstatements of fact, 
insinuations of facts not in evidence, and other “pronounced 
and persistent” misconduct, taken together, rendered the 
proceedings unfair and required a new trial.51 Berger’s 
  
 43 Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112-13. The Court sent the case back to state court for 
exhaustion of the new due process claim. Id. at 115. Despite pleas on Mooney’s behalf 
from Felix Frankfurter via President Wilson, the California governor refused to order a 
new trial. Mooney spent four more years in prison. He was released the same week 
that Frankfurter was appointed to the Supreme Court. Frankfurter’s intervention on 
Mooney’s behalf was cited against him during his confirmation hearings through, inter 
alia, a letter from Theodore Roosevelt deriding Frankfurter’s “besmirching the 
reputation of God-fearing, patriotic Americans . . . destroying respect for law and order, 
and coddling anarchist[s], bomb throwers, and cowards.” Ringhand, supra note 42, at 
805 & n.56 (citing MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE 
REFORM YEARS 99 (1982)). 
 44 Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112-15. 
 45 295 U.S. 78, 78 (1935). 
 46 Id. at 88. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id.  
 51 Id. at 89; see Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1, 4 (2005) (per curiam) 
(interpreting Berger’s holding as sounding in due process).  
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cumulative-prejudice analysis has remained a core component 
of constitutional criminal discovery doctrine.52 
In addition to Mooney and Berger, a third major due 
process discovery case emerged in 1935. That year a Kansas 
jury convicted Harry Pyle of a terrible series of crimes involving 
murder, torture, and theft.53 Despite the heinous nature of these 
offenses,54 the Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in Pyle v. 
Kansas opened the door to a significant expansion in 
constitutional criminal discovery rights and duties.55  
The Court held that Pyle’s “inexpertly drawn” but 
unrefuted pro se habeas petition required a hearing on claims that 
prosecutors convicted him through the knowing use of perjured 
testimony.56 That holding was consistent with Mooney, but the 
Court went further. Pyle articulated a separate and distinct claim 
that prosecutors engaged in “the deliberate suppression . . . of 
evidence favorable to him” beyond the facts relating to the 
allegedly perjured testimony.57 Citing Mooney, the Court held that 
Pyle’s claims, if proved, would require his release.58  
The Court applied the Pyle “favorable evidence” rule 
fifteen years later in another per curiam opinion. In Alcorta v. 
Texas, a capital case, the Court granted a pro se petition for 
certiorari, stayed execution, and reversed the Texas courts’ 
denials of postconviction relief.59 The reason: the prosecutor 
had suppressed evidence that Alcorta could have used to 
impeach a key state witness.60 Napue v. Illinois followed 
Alcorta by imposing a due process duty on the prosecution to 
correct testimony that is known to be false, even when the 
evidence is not directly exculpatory and instead can be used to 
  
 52 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439-40 (1995). 
 53 Kansas v. Pyle, 57 P.2d 93, 96-98 (Kan. 1936).  
 54 The murder victim’s brother committed suicide after testifying against 
Pyle, “apparently because of the aftereffects of the torture” the defendants had inflicted 
upon him. Id. at 98. 
 55 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942).  
 56 Id. at 215-16. 
 57 Id. (emphasis added). 
 58 Id. at 216. On remand, the Kansas Supreme Court found no evidence of 
perjury or suppression of favorable evidence. Pyle v. Amrine, 156 P.2d 509, 521 (Kan. 
1945). Pyle’s son was pardoned in 1959 after his conviction for these crimes. Alvin 
Dumler, Mass Murder Happened Before in Southwest Kansas, HUTCHINSON NEWS (Kan.), 
Nov. 22, 1959, at 2, available at http://hutchnews.com/www/clutterpdfs/cluttermurders-
day7-othermassmurders.pdf. But Bedau and Radelet appear mistaken in stating that 
“Pyle was released.” Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in 
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 153 & n. 791 (1987) (citing Pyle, 317 U.S. 
at 214); see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 190-93 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(compiling and discussing criticisms of Bedau-Radelet study). 
 59 355 U.S. 28, 28-32 (1957) (per curiam).  
 60 Id. at 30-32. 
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challenge the credibility of a prosecution witness.61 The Napue 
Court reasoned, “A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, 
if it is in any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has 
the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false 
and elicit the truth.”62 
Brady v. Maryland63 became the eponymous due process 
discovery case by building on the core meanings developed from 
Mooney and Pyle through Alcorta and Napue.64 First, Brady 
clarified prosecutors’ due process duty to disclose evidence 
favorable to the defense that is “material to guilt or 
punishment.”65 A second key Brady holding rendered 
prosecutors’ good or bad faith regarding nondisclosure 
irrelevant.66 Initial refinements of these two holdings focused 
on the elusive definition of materiality.  
Brady arose after the defendant was convicted of 
murder and sentenced to death.67 He later learned that his 
codefendant had confessed to committing the murder.68 The 
Court held the new evidence material to Brady’s defense. But 
the Court did not order a new trial. Instead, the Court ordered 
resentencing and gave some hints about the meaning of 
materiality in due process discovery doctrine.69 A key fact was 
Brady’s own confession to complicity in the murder.70 The 
Court reasoned that, in light of Brady’s confession, the 
undisclosed evidence would have been unlikely to alter the 
jury’s verdict on Brady’s guilt.71 In contrast, the Court held, 
evidence of shared culpability between the codefendants could 
have affected jurors’ views on Brady’s eligibility for the death 
sentence.72  
  
 61 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959). 
 62 Id. The prosecutor elicited the same lie on redirect examination. Instead of 
holding the elicitation of that perjured testimony an independent due process violation 
under Mooney, the Court, instead, took it as proof of prejudice from the due process 
violation that occurred when the prosecutor suppressed the truth during cross-
examination. The prosecutor proved the lie’s significance, the Court held, by 
deliberately eliciting the same lie on redirect. Id. 
 63 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 64 Id. at 87.  
 65 Id.  
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 84. 
 68 Id. at 87.  
 69 Id. at 87-88. 
 70 See id. at 84. 
 71 Id. at 89. 
 72 Id. at 88-91. The state resentenced Brady to life eight years later. Brady v. 
Superintendent, Anne Arundel Cnty. Detention Ctr., 443 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 (4th Cir. 1971).  
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After Brady, the Court clarified that due process 
disclosure duties encompass all material impeachment 
evidence.73 But the Court took another twenty-two years to 
define the term material. In crafting that definition in United 
States v. Bagley,74 the Court borrowed from new jurisprudence 
governing the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel. Bagley grafted the prejudice definition from the 
ineffective assistance test onto due process doctrine governing 
prosecutors’ duty to disclose evidence beneficial to the 
defense.75 Therefore, to prove that undisclosed evidence is 
material, defendants must show “a reasonable probability” of a 
different result in the case had the undisclosed evidence been 
available to the defense.76 A “reasonable probability [is] a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”77  
A decade passed before the next significant refinement in 
due process disclosure doctrine. In Kyles v. Whitley,78 the Court 
undertook a detailed assessment of the alleged disclosure 
violations. Such detail was necessary, according to the 
concurring Justices, because prosecutors serving under Orleans 
Parish District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr. committed “blatant 
and repeated violations of a well-settled constitutional 
obligation” to reveal favorable evidence.79 Ordering a new trial,80 
the Court clarified due process disclosure doctrine in several 
important ways. First, Kyles expanded on the key Brady holding 
that prosecutors’ good or bad faith regarding undisclosed 
evidence is irrelevant.81 Kyles reiterated the longstanding 
  
 73 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). 
 74 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
 75 Id. at 682-83 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 664, 668 (1984)). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 682. In another key holding, Bagley eliminated the “demand” 
requirement of Brady’s due process discovery doctrine, imposing a disclosure duty upon 
prosecutors even in the absence of any defense request for the information. Id.  
 78 514 U.S. 419 (1995).  
 79 Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring). Kyles’s first trial ended in a hung jury. His 
second trial began on December 6, 1984 and ended in his conviction and death sentence. 
Petitioner’s Brief at *2, Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (No. 93-7927) [hereinafter 
Kyles Pet. Br.]. On the same morning that Kyles’s second trial began, Raymond T. Liuzza, 
Jr., “son of a prominent New Orleans business executive,” was murdered in front of his 
home. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1371 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). John 
Thompson was convicted and sentenced to death for Liuzza’s murder. Id. at 1374. 
Thompson’s trial, like Kyles’s, took less than three days, including death-qualification of 
the jury, the guilt/innocence phase, and the sentencing phase. Compare Kyles Pet. Br. at 
*6 (trial completed December 6-8, 1984), with Petitioner’s Brief at 12, Connick, 131 S. Ct. 
1350 (No. 09-571) (trial completed May 6-8, 1985). 
 80 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421. 
 81 Id. at 433, 437-38. 
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principle that prosecutors are responsible for disclosing evidence 
in their own files as well as evidence held by other prosecutors in 
the same office.82 But Kyles also explained that prosecutors must 
obtain and disclose evidence held by case investigators that is 
materially beneficial to the defense, whether or not prosecutors 
know the evidence exists.83  
Kyles retained Berger’s cumulative-prejudice principle.84 
But Kyles also focused closely on the link between the Brady due 
process materiality test and the Sixth Amendment prejudice test 
for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. 
Washington.85 There are three critical components of this 
doctrinal link. First, the defendant’s burden to prove a 
“reasonable probability” of a different outcome is less than a 
preponderance of the evidence.86 Putting the familiar 
preponderance test in the Brady context, defendants need not 
advance the prejudice ball past the fifty-yard line; they do not 
have to show that it is more likely than not that the cumulative 
effect of the undisclosed evidence would have led to a different 
verdict.87  
Kyles also clarified the distinction between Brady 
materiality and Strickland prejudice, on one hand, and the test 
for sufficiency of the evidence, on the other.88 The latter test is 
governed by Jackson v. Virginia.89 Under Jackson, the defense 
must prove that no reasonable juror would vote for conviction 
when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution.90 The Kyles Court held that the demanding 
Jackson standard is inappropriately onerous, in the context of 
prosecutors’ due process duties, to ensuring that defendants 
receive fair trials resulting in verdicts that reliably warrant 
public (and judicial) confidence.91 In the constitutional 
discovery and ineffective assistance settings, therefore, courts 
must weigh the strength and weakness of all the evidence that 
is presented by both parties in both the trial and postconviction 
proceedings.92  
  
 82 Id. at 432-37.  
 83 Id. at 437; see also Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869-70 
(2006) (police suppression of exculpatory evidence violates Brady). 
 84 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436. 
 85 Id. at 437. 
 86 Id. at 434-35. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38. 
 92 Id. at 434-35 & n.8.  
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Finally, Kyles emphasized the significant responsibility 
that accompanies prosecutors’ authority to make discretionary 
decisions about disclosing Brady-line evidence. The Court 
cautioned that “a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to 
the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence.”93  
II. DUE PROCESS TAKES A DIVE 
New Orleans prosecutors did not “tack[] too close to the 
wind”94 in John Thompson’s case. They sank the ship. The 
Louisiana Court of Appeal concluded that Orleans Parish 
prosecutors put Thompson on death row through the “intentional 
hiding of exculpatory evidence.”95 That evidence, when unearthed 
by a determined defense investigator, contributed to dismissal 
and acquittal on the robbery and murder charges, respectively, 
that the prosecutors had used to seek Thompson’s execution.96  
Thompson’s case is one of many in which nondisclosure 
of exculpatory evidence imposed unnecessary harm.97 Criminal 
discovery reform is necessary because the constitutional 
disclosure duties traced in Part I suffer from limited scope and 
weak enforceability.98 Noncompliance and significant system 
costs are the predictable results. To cite examples from John 
Thompson’s jurisdiction alone, numerous reported Brady cases 
from Harry Connick’s tenure as Orleans Parish District 
Attorney involved prosecutors failing to disclose evidence to the 
  
 93 Id. at 439. Kyles spent more than a decade on Louisiana’s death row before 
the Supreme Court ordered a new trial. Id. at 421. After three subsequent trials ended in 
hung juries, Connick’s office dismissed the charges. JED HORNE, DESIRE STREET: A TRUE 
STORY OF DEATH AND DELIVERANCE IN NEW ORLEANS 317-21 (2005). In July 2010, Kyles 
was charged with the first-degree murder and second-degree kidnapping of Crystal St. 
Pierre, arising from an alleged dispute over the value of a food stamp card. See Alan 
Powell II, Curtis Kyles May Have Killed Woman over Food Stamp Card, TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(July 7, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/07/ 
curtis_kyles_may_have_killed_w.html; see also If Kyles Killed . . ., JEDHORNE.COM, 
http://jedhorne.com/2010/06/did-kyles-kill/ (last visited July 3, 2011).  
 94 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439. 
 95 State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 557-58 (La. Ct. App.) (reversing order 
denying Thompson a new trial), rev. denied, 829 So. 2d 427 (La. 2002). 
 96 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355 (2011). 
 97 See supra note 1; see infra note 100.  
 98 There is near unanimity among courts and commentators that 
enforceability of Brady-line disclosure duties has remained problematic from the 
outset. Johns, supra note 5, at 516-21; Daniel Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533 (2010); Ridolfi, supra note 32, at 2030-31 (existing disclosure 
rules “are not doing enough because they are inadequate and sometimes not enforced 
at all”); Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship 
Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129 (Carol Steiker 
ed., 2006). For an expression of judicial frustration with the development of Brady 
doctrine, see United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1309-11 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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defense for timely use at trial.99 Discovery violations required 
new trials in seventeen of those cases.100 In the most recent case, 
Smith v. Cain, the Court vacated a quintuple-murder 
conviction.101  
Such statistics, and the associated inefficiencies and 
unfairness, result from inherent flaws in the governing 
doctrine and from practical realities confronting those charged 
with implementation. At the doctrinal level, the first critical 
weakness is Brady’s mistaken assumption that prosecutors are 
as well equipped as defense attorneys to recognize the 
exculpatory or impeachment value of particular pieces of 
evidence. Second, Brady’s built-in materiality prejudice 
standard requires prosecutors to assess, ex ante, a question that 
often can be answered only ex post: whether the cumulative 
  
 99 Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630-31 (2012); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419, 421 (1995); Mahler v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494, 503 (5th Cir. 2008); Crawford v Cain, 
248 F. App’x 500, 504-07 (5th Cir. 2007); Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1360 (5th Cir. 
1994); Monroe v. Blackburn, 748 F.2d 958, 959-60 (5th Cir. 1984); Davis v. Heyd, 479 
F.2d 446, 453 (5th Cir. 1973); Perez v. Cain, No. 04-1905, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1660, 
at *59-64 (E.D. La. 2008); Sholes v. Cain, No. 06-1831, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99960, at 
*33-34 (E.D. La. 2007); Joseph v. Whitley, No. 92-2335, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17385, 
at *5-12 (E.D. La. 1992); Brown v. Donnelly, No. 89-4062, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13155, at *21-26 (E.D. La. 1990); State v. Bright, 875 So. 2d 37, 44 (La. 2004); State v. 
Kemp, 828 So. 2d 540, 546 (La. 2002); State v. Marshall; 660 So. 2d 819, 827 (La. 1995); 
State v. Knapper, 579 So. 2d 956, 961 (La. 1991); State v. Rosiere, 488 So. 2d 965, 970-
71 (La. 1986); State v. Perkins, 423 So. 2d 1103, 1107-08 (La. 1982); State v. Curtis, 
384 So. 2d 396, 397 (La. 1980); State v. Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415, 416-19 (La. 1978);; 
State v. Carney, 334 So. 2d 415, 419 (La. 1976); State of LA In the Interest of L.V., 66 
So. 3d 558, 561-62; (La. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Jones, No. 2008-KA-0516, 2009 La. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 214, at *24-45 (La. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Goodwin, 881 So. 2d 
1229, 1235-36 (La. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Lindsey, 844 So. 2d 961, 963-70 (La. Ct. 
App. 2003); State v. Collins, 826 So. 2d 598, 611-12 (La. Ct. App. 2002); State v. 
Nightengale, 818 So. 2d 819, 824-25 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Thompson, 825 So. 2d at 557-
58; State v. Lee, 778 So. 2d 656, 667 (La. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Moore, 777 So. 2d 
600, 605-06 (La. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Major, 708 So. 2d 813, 817-18 (La. Ct. App. 
1998); State v. Grubbs, 644 So. 2d 1105, 1110-11 (La. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Duncan, 
648 So. 2d 1090, 1099-1100 (La. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Wolfe, 630 So. 2d 872, 879-80 
(La. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Dozier, 553 So. 2d 931, 933 (La. Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Walter, 514 So. 2d 620, 621-22 (La. Ct. App. 1987).  
 100 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 630-31; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421; Mahler, 537 F.3d at 
503; Monroe, 607 F.2d at 152-53; Davis, 479 F.2d at 453; Perez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1660, at *59-64; Bright, 875 So. 2d at 44; Knapper, 579 So. 2d at 961; Rosiere, 488 So. 
2d at 970-71; Perkins, 423 So. 2d at 1107-08; Curtis, 384 So. 2d at 397; Falkins, 356 So. 
2d at 416-19; Carney, 334 So. 2d at 419; Lindsey, 844 So. 2d at 969-70; Kemp, 828 So. 
2d at 546; Thompson, 825 So. 2d at 557-58; Lee, 778 So. 2d at 667; In State v. Parker, 
361 So. 2d 226, 227 (La. 1978), the Court ordered a new trial because it was impossible 
to reconstruct the record in order to litigate the Brady claim on appeal; the defendant 
then withdrew the appeal. 
 101 132 S. Ct. at 630. By an 8-1 vote, the majority tersely rejected Justice 
Thomas’s conclusion, based on a detailed assessment of the evidence, that the 
defendant failed to satisfy Brady’s materiality standard. Instead, the Court 
emphasized conflicts between the pretrial statements and trial testimony of the lone 
eyewitness to link the defendant to the murders.  
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impact of evidence beneficial to the defense would have created 
a reasonable possibility of a different result if it had been 
disclosed to the defense in time to be used during the 
investigation and litigation of the original proceeding.102  
The two flaws are linked. From some perspectives, 
Brady’s materiality test imposes upon prosecutors as much a 
duty of divination as disclosure.103 Cognitive phenomena such 
as tunnel vision, groupthink, confirmation bias, and avoidance 
of cognitive dissonance raise additional psychosocial barriers to 
Brady compliance.104 These pervasive, unconscious patterns of 
cognition can trump even the best of prosecutorial intentions. 
Brady’s enforceability took another hit at the doctrinal 
level when the Supreme Court shrank law enforcement’s 
constitutional duties to investigate and retain exculpatory 
information. Investigators have no due process duty to 
investigate information that helps the defense.105 Although 
prosecutors are responsible for obtaining Brady information 
from their investigative agents,106 officers can destroy potentially 
exculpatory evidence with impunity unless a defendant can 
  
 102 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (“[T]he prosecution, which alone can know what is 
undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net 
effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of [materiality] is 
reached.”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (“[T]he significance of an 
item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is 
complete.”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 
(1985); see Cassidy, supra note 37, at 1437-45.  
 103 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 (“[T]he character of a piece of evidence as favorable 
will often turn on the context of the existing or potential evidentiary record.”). 
 104 Mosteller, supra note 5, at 309-12; Alafair S. Burke, Improving 
Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1587, 1602-12 (2006); Ronald F. Wright, New Perspectives on Brady and Other 
Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Group on Best Practices: Systems and 
Culture, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1995-2010 (2010). 
 105 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979). Several circuits have 
distinguished Baker. See Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 498-99 (6th Cir. 2009) (arresting 
officer must consider both “inculpatory and exculpatory evidence” in determining 
whether there is probable cause to arrest); Russo v. City of Bridgeport, No. 05-4302-CV, 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16171, at *23-30 (2d Cir. Feb. 27), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 818 (2007) 
(allowing civil rights claim to proceed under Fourth Amendment where arresting officers 
detained plaintiff while failing to investigate readily available exculpatory evidence) 
(collecting cases and correcting Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2007)); 
see also Fisher, supra note 4, at 1399-1401 (describing police duty to investigate 
exculpatory evidence under England’s “tough on crime” Criminal Procedure and 
Investigation Act 1996, ch. 25 (Eng.)). 
 106 Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869-70 (2006) (per curiam) 
(“Brady suppression occurs when the government fails to turn over even evidence that 
is ‘known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.’” (quoting Kyles, 514 
U.S. at 438)). On remand, the West Virginia Supreme Court ordered a new trial over 
heated dissents. State v. Youngblood, 650 S.E.2d 119, 132-33 (W. Va. 2007) (Davis, 
C.J.); id. at 134-36 (Benjamin, J., dissenting); id. at 137-40 (Maynard, J., dissenting). 
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prove bad faith.107 At a practical level, when law enforcement 
does obtain and preserve Brady evidence, economic realities 
undercut the enforceability of prosecutors’ constitutional 
disclosure duties. Heavy caseloads create an independent 
hurdle to compliance, as prosecutors are charged with 
identifying and disclosing Brady material held by all 
prosecutorial staff and their agents, including law 
enforcement.108 Political pressure can be a factor as well. 
Prosecutorial elections are often dominated by “tough on crime” 
ideologies, which tend to be unsympathetic toward procedures 
that help defendants avoid or reduce punishment.109  
Brady’s enforceability sustained another blow when the 
Supreme Court declined to impose a due process duty to 
disclose impeachment evidence at the plea-bargaining stage, 
where the overwhelming majority of cases are resolved.110 The 
Court also held that the right to Brady material does not apply 
in the specialized pretrial setting of the grand jury hearing.111 
At the postconviction stage, the same five-member majority 
common to Connick and Garcetti rejected a claim that due 
  
 107 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988). 
 108 Youngblood, 547 U.S. at 869-70. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the 
question whether law enforcement officers may face civil liability under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 for deliberately suppressing or otherwise failing to disclose Brady material. For 
a canvassing of divided opinions on this issue in the federal courts of appeals, see 
Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 377-81 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 3504 (2010); id. at 401-04 (Kethledge, J., dissenting in part); see also Smith v. 
Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that police may face liability 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)); Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial 
Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1016-
32, 1062-65 (2010) (analyzing Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1991)). For a 
discussion of “Brady” lists, which target law enforcement officers for discipline when 
they fail to provide prosecutors with exculpatory and impeachment evidence, see Nazir v. 
Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-06546 SVW (AGRx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26820 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 2, 2011) (prosecutor’s office shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
lawsuit by officer fired for nondisclosure of Brady evidence); Walters v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 
No. CV 04-1920-PHX-NVW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006) 
(describing “Brady list” policy); Christopher N. Osher, Denver Cops’ Credibility Problems 
Not Always Clear to Defenders, Juries, DENVER POST (July 10, 2011, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_18448755#ixzz1Rv2c57Iu (identifying “one out of 
every 17 Denver police officers as having discipline issues serious enough that their 
courtroom testimony may be suspect” and describing debate over effectiveness of 
procedures for notifying defense lawyers of such issues). 
 109 ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 166-69 & 232 n.15 (2007) (citing examples); Wright, supra note 104, at 
1999-2000 (noting potential “good or bad” influences of politics on disclosure decisions); 
Daniel Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the 
Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2201-05 (2010) (describing internal 
and external pressures on prosecutorial decision making, including relationships with 
police, victims, and electorate). 
 110 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).  
 111 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992). 
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process imposes an independent duty to produce evidence that 
can prove a defendant’s innocence, beyond the duty imposed by 
state statutes governing access to such evidence.112 As a 
practical matter, the majority of convicted defendants who are 
indigent lack access to counsel and other resources needed to 
investigate and litigate Brady claims.113 Thus, there is “little 
reason for these violations ever to come to light.”114  
The majority of postconviction Brady claims do not 
succeed, often because courts hold that undisclosed information 
was either immaterial115 or available to the defense through a 
reasonable investigation.116 Habeas jurisprudence combined with 
the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
heightened procedural hurdles to federal judicial review of state-
court Brady claims.117 Finally, even before the five-member 
Supreme Court majority restricted § 1983 liability in Connick and 
  
 112 Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 
2308, 2319-20 (2009). But see Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011) (allowing due 
process challenge to implementation of Texas DNA testing procedures). 
 113 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (no federal constitutional 
right to counsel in state post-conviction); Bruce Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors 
About Their Disclosure Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ 
Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2175-76 & n.68 (2010) (describing limited access to 
resources). Some courts have held that, by definition, anything available to the defense 
through reasonable investigation is not Brady evidence. Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 
560 (5th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 975 n.4 (4th Cir. 1995). On the 
chronic underfunding of defense investigative training and support, see THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 93-95 (2009); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting 
the Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea 
for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 959-73 (2010) (critiquing proposals to ration 
service and absorb defense investigative function into law enforcement, prosecutorial, 
judicial, and forensic science functions in Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense 
Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1590, 
1613-45 (2005), and Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An 
Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 801 (2004)). 
 114 Green, supra note 113, at 2175 n.68 (citing, inter alia, United States v. 
Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 172 (D. Mass. 2009) (reported cases cannot measure scope 
of disclosure violations); United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(confessing “the nagging concern that material favorable to the defense may never 
emerge from secret government files”)). 
 115 See, e.g., supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
 116 Rector, 120 F.3d at 560 (“evidence is not ‘suppressed’ if the defendant 
either knew, or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take 
advantage of any exculpatory evidence” (citing West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1399 
(5th Cir. 1996))); Barnes, 58 F.3d at 975 & n.4 (“Brady requires that the government 
disclose only evidence that is not available to the defense from other sources, either 
directly or through diligent investigation”); United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 918 
(2d Cir. 1993) (“Evidence is not ‘suppressed’ if the defendant either knew, or should 
have known, of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory 
evidence.” (citations omitted)). Under this analysis, defendants must plead alternative 
ineffective assistance claims based on failure to investigate.  
 117 Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the 
Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 98-104 (2012).  
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Garcetti,118 judicially imposed doctrines of absolute and qualified 
immunity rendered civil rights litigation nearly useless as a 
mechanism for enforcing due process disclosure duties.119  
The foregoing doctrinal and practical limitations 
seriously weaken the enforceability of prosecutors’ due process 
disclosure duties. The next section focuses closely on the 
Connick and Garcetti cases as recent exemplars of the resulting 
inefficiency, uncertainty, and unfairness in the processing of 
criminal cases. Part IV contrasts the flawed Brady model with 
the relative simplicity and efficiency of full open file discovery. 
Highlighting the vitality of law and politics in this cutting-edge 
reform initiative, Part IV urges that the contrast between the 
two models should motivate broad enactment of full open file 
reform across jurisdictions.  
III. DUE PROCESS SUBMERGED  
Connick and Garcetti are linked in their subordination 
of prosecutors’ constitutional discovery duties to other 
interests, including the protection of municipalities from 
financial liability for prosecutors’ acts and omissions regarding 
Brady material. Analyzing the link between the two cases 
requires close scrutiny of their distinctive facts, procedural 
posture, and judicial reasoning. Subsections A and B focus on 
Connick v. Thompson. The more doctrinally complex Garcetti 
case is analyzed in Subsections C through E. 
A. Connick v. Thompson: “Egregious” and “Intentional” 
Misconduct in Orleans Parish 
John Thompson was twenty-two years old when he and 
codefendant Kevin Freeman were arrested for the murder of 
Raymond T. Liuzza, Jr., in New Orleans.120 Liuzza was shot to 
death in early December, 1984, during a robbery outside his 
home.121 “Because Liuzza was the son of a prominent executive, 
  
 118 See discussion infra Part III. 
 119 Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 339 (2009) (absolute immunity 
from personal liability for failure to train on Brady duties); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409, 420 (1976). 
 120 Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 843, 865 (5th Cir. 2008). Thompson 
and Freeman were linked to Liuzza’s death by Richard Perkins, who approached 
Liuzza’s family after a reward was offered. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1371 
(2011). Perkins alleged that Thompson sold the murder weapon and Liuzza’s ring to a 
man named David Harris. State v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d. 349, 351 (La. 1987).  
 121 Thompson, 516 So. 2d. at 351. 
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the murder received a lot of attention.”122 Three weeks after 
Liuzza’s murder, the three children of a man named LaGarde 
fought off a carjacking attempt near the Superdome.123 After 
Thompson and Freeman were arrested in January for Liuzza’s 
murder, Thompson’s photo was published in the Times-
Picayune.124 LaGarde showed the photo to his children. They 
agreed that Thompson was the man who had tried to rob 
them.125  
Prosecutors charged Thompson with armed robbery.126 
Then they switched the order of the murder and robbery 
trials.127 They hoped to use the robbery conviction to keep 
Thompson off the stand at the murder trial, to impeach him if 
he testified, and to win a death sentence.128 One prosecutor told 
Thompson at the robbery trial, “I’m going to fry you. You will 
die in the electric chair.”129 With the exception of that specific 
denouement, the prosecution’s strategy succeeded. 
The strategy succeeded in part because Thompson’s 
lawyers and the jurors in his robbery trial did not know that a 
patch of bloody cloth exonerated him on that charge. During 
the investigation of the LaGarde robbery, law enforcement 
officers seized a blood swatch from the scene.130 Prosecutors 
ordered the blood tested before Thompson’s trial for the 
LaGarde robbery.131 The swatch tested type B,132 but the 
prosecution disclosed neither the swatch nor the lab report to 
the defense. Thompson’s trial lawyer had asked the property 
technician before trial if there was any blood evidence.133 He 
was told that “[t]hey didn’t have any.”134 On the first day of the 
robbery trial, assistant prosecutor Gerry Deegan “checked all of 
the physical evidence in the case out of the police property 
room.”135 The next day Deegan returned everything but the 
  
 122 Thompson, 553 F.3d at 843.  
 123 Id.  
 124 Id.  
 125 Id.  
 126 Id.  
 127 Id.  
 128 Id.  
 129 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1374 & n.7 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 130 Id. at 1356 (majority opinion). 
 131 Id.  
 132 Id. at 1372-73 & n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 133 Id. 
 134 Id.  
 135 Id. at 1356 (majority opinion). 
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blood swatch.136 At the time, Deegan was just out of law school 
and had worked in Connick’s office for less than a year.137  
During Thompson’s murder trial, the prosecution also 
failed to disclose several pieces of impeachment evidence. First, 
law enforcement had secretly taped the conversation between 
the Liuzza family and Richard Perkins, the man who originally 
incriminated Thompson in the Liuzza murder.138 At trial, 
Perkins denied seeking reward money.139 But on the tape, 
Perkins had said, “I don’t mind helping . . . but I would like [you] 
to help me and, you know, I’ll help you.”140 After the family had 
told Perkins that they wanted to try to help him, he implicated 
Thompson and Freeman.141 The prosecution also failed to 
disclose eyewitness testimony describing Liuzza’s killer as “six 
feet tall, with ‘close cut hair.’”142 That description matched 
Thompson’s codefendant, Freeman. In contrast, Thompson was 
five-feet, eight-inches tall and had a large Afro.143 The 
prosecution also failed to disclose pretrial statements attributed 
to the codefendant Freeman, the key witness against Thompson, 
which were materially inconsistent with Freeman’s trial 
testimony.144 Without the benefit of the foregoing evidence, and 
facing impeachment with the attempted robbery conviction if he 
took the stand, Thompson elected not to testify.145 He was 
convicted and sentenced to death.146 
Thompson was incarcerated for eighteen years after his 
arrest in January 1985. He spent fourteen of those years in 
twenty-three-hour-a-day solitary confinement in a six-by-nine 
foot windowless death row cell.147 He faced six different 
execution dates148 as his case moved through direct appeal, 
state postconviction, and federal habeas.149 A month before his 
final execution date, a last-ditch investigation in police archives 
unearthed a microfiche copy of the report documenting that the 
  
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 1372 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 138 Id. at 1371. 
 139 Id. at 1374.  
 140 Id. at 1371. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 1371-72. 
 144 Id. at 1374. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 1355 (majority opinion); Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 842, 
865 (5th Cir. 2008).  
 148 John Thompson, Op-Ed., The Prosecution Rests, but I Can’t, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/opinion/10thompson.html?pagewanted=all. 
 149 State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 552-53 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
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LaGarde robber had type B blood.150 The defense tested 
Thompson’s blood. It was type O.151 The report proved Thompson 
innocent of the attempted robbery conviction that had kept him 
from testifying in his own defense at the murder trial and had 
helped the prosecution argue for his execution.152  
After the defense investigator uncovered the blood test 
results, a former prosecutor named Michael Riehlmann came 
forward. Riehlmann admitted that, five years earlier, Gerry 
Deegan had confessed to hiding exculpatory blood evidence in 
Thompson’s robbery case.153 Deegan was the recent law graduate 
who assisted with the prosecution of the robbery case; he 
confessed to hiding the evidence after learning that he was dying 
of cancer.154 Despite Riehlmann’s encouragement, Deegan did 
not come forward.155 For the next five years, neither did 
Riehlmann.156  
Based on the blood mismatch, the trial court vacated 
Thompson’s attempted robbery conviction,157 and Connick’s office 
dismissed that charge.158 The trial judge in the murder case 
denied Thompson’s request for a new trial but vacated his death 
sentence.159 The appellate court ordered a new trial on the 
murder charge.160 The court found it unnecessary to rule on 
Thompson’s Brady claim but concluded that the prosecution’s 
“egregious” misconduct in the “intentional hiding of exculpatory 
evidence” caused violations of Thompson’s rights to present a 
defense and testify on his own behalf at the first trial.161 
Connick’s office retried the murder charge but the codefendant, 
Freeman, had died in the interim.162 Without Freeman’s live 
testimony (the jury heard his prior testimony read back)—but 
with the benefit of the previously withheld evidence and 
Thompson’s testimony—the jury voted to acquit after thirty-five 
minutes’ deliberation.163 
  
 150 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011). 
 151 Id.  
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 1356 & n.1. 
 154 Id.  
 155 Id. at 1374-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 156 Id. 
 157 State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 553 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 158 Id.  
 159 Id.  
 160 Id. at 557-58.  
 161 Id. at 557.  
 162 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1375-76 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 163 Id.  
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B. Deliberate Indifference 
The jury in Thompson’s federal civil rights case found 
that the admitted Brady violation resulted from deliberate 
indifference to prosecutors’ obvious need for training on their 
due process disclosure duties.164 Writing for the five-member 
majority, Justice Thomas limited the scope of the Brady 
violation at issue to nondisclosure of the lab report, which 
Connick conceded was a violation of Thompson’s due process 
rights.165 The Court then held that Thompson had failed to 
meet his burden to prove deliberate indifference because he 
showed neither that there was a pattern of prior violations that 
should have notified defendants of the need for training nor 
that the need for training was otherwise obvious.166 On the 
latter point, the majority concluded that municipalities that 
might otherwise face liability for failure to train prosecutors on 
their due process discovery duties could reasonably rely on law 
schools, bar exams, continuing legal education programs, and 
professional disciplinary procedures to fill the breach.167  
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg found ample record 
evidence to support the jury’s finding of deliberate indifference, 
including multiple Brady violations by “no fewer than five 
prosecutors” who, “year upon year,” withheld evidence “vital to 
[Thompson’s] defense.”168 The dissenters also disagreed that 
Connick justifiably relied on law schools and other institutions 
  
 164 Id. at 1376. 
 165 Id. at 1357 & n.3 (majority opinion). 
 166 Id. at 1358-66 (citing Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). The majority did not cite the unanimous 2009 
decision in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein to apply absolute immunity to petitioners despite 
being urged to do so. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 18, Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350 
(No. 09-571); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorneys in 
Support of Petitioners at 7-8, Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (No. 09-571); Brief of Amicus 
National District Attorneys Association at 16, Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (No. 09-571). 
Van de Kamp granted absolute immunity to prosecutors sued in their individual 
capacities for damages caused by their failure to sufficiently train and supervise their 
deputy district attorneys in preventing the nondisclosure of material impeachment 
evidence. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 339 (2009). On remand, the plaintiff 
settled for monetary damages from the city of Long Beach, Goldstein v. City of Long 
Beach, CV 04-9692, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111195 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010), after the 
District Court expressed “little doubt that Plaintiff w[ould] succeed in proving” that the 
withheld evidence satisfied Brady and sketched the likely jury instructions regarding 
the prosecutors’ violations of their due process disclosure duties. Id. at *8-11. 
 167 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361-63. 
 168 Id. at 1374-75, 1383 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Alito 
joined in a concurring opinion taking issue with Justice Ginsburg’s analysis. Id. at 
1366-70 (Scalia & Alito, JJ., concurring). 
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to fulfill the training requirements necessary to prevent due 
process disclosure violations in his office.169 
Several aspects of the majority opinion elide core 
meanings of due process discovery doctrine. Greater fidelity to 
prosecutors’ truth-speaking and justice-seeking duties might 
have reinforced the doctrinal stability that encourages 
compliance with those duties.170 Examples include the 
majority’s cabining of its analysis to what it defined as a “single 
Brady violation” that occurred when one or more prosecutors 
failed to turn over the lab report.171 Another is the conclusion 
that prior reversals of Orleans Parish convictions for Brady 
violations were irrelevant to the jury’s finding of deliberate 
indifference because “[n]one of those cases involved failure to 
disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or physical or 
scientific evidence of any kind.”172 Yet another is the empirical 
support (or absence thereof) in the majority’s assessment of 
whether the need for prosecutorial training was obvious.173 Also 
noteworthy is the sotto voce questioning in the majority 
opinion, rendered overt in the concurrence, of whether Orleans 
Parish prosecutors violated Brady by failing to disclose the lab 
report since they did not know Thompson’s blood type.174 These 
aspects of the majority opinion typify the diminution of core 
due process meanings that might influence adjudication of 
substantive constitutional criminal procedure claims, create 
uncertainty in the law, and reduce its deterrent effect.175 This 
discussion focuses on the first and last points identified above. 
1. Canton-izing Cumulative Review 
Cabining the misconduct in John Thompson’s case to 
the conceded nondisclosure of the lab report is inconsistent 
with the core due process principle that Brady materiality 
  
 169 Id. at 1380-81, 1385-86 & nn.21-22 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 170 See Laurin, supra note 108, at 1058-72. 
 171 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357-60. 
 172 Id. at 1360. At least two other Orleans Parish defendants sought Brady 
relief after prosecutors failed to disclose lab reports documenting test results on 
biological samples; in both cases, courts held the undisclosed evidence to fail Brady’s 
materiality test. Joseph v. Whitley, No. 92-2335, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17385, at *5-12 
(E.D. La. 1992); State v. Walter, 675 So. 2d 831, 833-35 (La. Ct. App. 1996).  
 173 See supra note 21. 
 174 Compare Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357 & n.3 (majority opinion), with id. at 
1369-70 (Scalia & Alito, JJ., concurring). 
 175 See Laurin, supra note 108, at 1059-61.  
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must be assessed cumulatively.176 The majority subordinated 
that principle in favor of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remedial rule 
pulled from dicta in Canton v. Harris.177 To fit Canton’s 
Procrustean bed, the Connick majority trimmed Orleans Parish 
prosecutors’ acts and omissions down to a “single Brady 
violation” or a “single-incident.”178  
In considering the majority’s subordination of the 
cumulative materiality principle, it is important to 
acknowledge that no court ever expressly ruled that Connick’s 
office violated Brady in Thompson’s case. But the state Court of 
Appeal concluded that the prosecutors committed “egregious” 
misconduct through the “intentional hiding of exculpatory 
evidence.”179 That court also concluded that the “intentional 
hiding of exculpatory evidence” caused the violations of 
Thompson’s right to testify and present a defense, which in 
turn required a new trial on the murder charge.180 These tightly 
linked state court findings and conclusions comprise the 
essential elements of a Brady violation: Orleans Parish 
prosecutors failed to disclose evidence materially beneficial to 
the defense. The absence of an express judicial ruling on 
Thompson’s Brady claims should not have weighed against him 
in the subsequent civil rights litigation. And the state courts’ 
granting relief on alternate grounds certainly did not warrant 
subordination of cumulative prejudice analysis to Canton’s 
single-incident calculus. 
Similarly, Connick’s admitting that his office violated 
Brady by failing to disclose the lab report did not support the 
majority’s elision of cumulative materiality. Both the content 
and the context of the admission make the point clear. Connick 
testified before the jury in Thompson’s civil rights case that he 
knew the lab report was Brady material.181 More specifically, he 
testified that he knew nondisclosure of the report was illegal 
because in a prior case he “got indicted by the U.S. Attorney” 
for failing to disclose a lab report to the defense.182  
  
 176 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995); see also Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 
1377 & n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421) (jury not limited 
to nondisclosure of lab report).  
 177 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359-69 (majority opinion) (discussing Canton v. 
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989)). 
 178 Id. at 1356, 1361. 
 179 Louisiana v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 557 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 180 Id. 
 181 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1380 n.13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 182 Id. (“[A] prosecutor must disclose a crime lab report to the defense, even if 
the prosecutor does not know the defendant’s blood type: ‘Under the law it qualifies as 
Brady material. Under Louisiana law we must turn that over. Under Brady we must 
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Connick’s sworn admission grounds a reasonable 
inference, apparently reached by the federal jury, that he had 
ample notice of the need to train his line prosecutors on Brady 
compliance. Connick’s admission on the lab report expressly 
references a prior Brady allegation directly on point in 
Thompson’s civil rights case. The admission weighs in favor of 
incorporating the core cumulative prejudice principle into the 
section 1983 analysis and weighs against the majority’s 
subordinating that principle to Canton’s single-incident doctrine. 
2. See No Evil: Incorporating a Subjective Knowledge 
Element into Brady Analysis 
Connick’s admission regarding the lab report took an 
even stronger turn on appeal of the civil rights verdict. There, 
the defendants argued that “the blood evidence was obviously 
exculpatory” and that nondisclosure was “a clear violation of 
the law.”183 Once again, the state Court of Appeal’s reasoning 
seems significant. Even setting aside the rather abundant 
impeachment evidence that prosecutors failed to disclose184 in 
addition to the conceded nondisclosure of the lab report, the 
record also contains the state Court of Appeal’s conclusion that 
prosecutors intentionally hid exculpatory evidence.185 It is not 
clear that prosecutors intentionally withheld the lab report.186 
But Deegan admitted to deliberately hiding exculpatory 
evidence; he took the physical evidence out of police custody 
and returned everything but the blood swatch.187 Applying 
cumulative materiality analysis, the swatch had exculpatory 
value independent of the lab report, and the prosecution had a 
duty to disclose it regardless of the existence of any lab report. 
  
turn that over.’”). In 1989, Connick pleaded not guilty to federal conspiracy charges for 
giving documents to another defendant who, Connick contended, needed them to 
defend himself on bookmaking charges. New Orleans Official Denies Aiding Gambler, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1989, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1989/12/22/us/new-orleans-official-denies-aiding-gambler.html. 
 183 Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 857 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 
1372 & n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[A]ny reasonable prosecutor would have recognized 
blood evidence as Brady material . . . [accordingly,] ‘the proper response’ was ‘obvious to 
all.’”). The court of appeals rejected this “obvious violation” defense not because it 
disagreed with the statement but because while Connick conceded his Brady duty to turn 
over the blood evidence, his line prosecutors did not. Connick, 553 F.3d at 857. 
 184 See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text. 
 185 Thompson, 825 So. 2d at 557. 
 186 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356 (lead prosecutor denied seeing the report). 
 187 Id. 
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This is so because the swatch, on its own, would have alerted 
the defense to the need to check Thompson’s blood type.188  
On this point, and of the remaining highlighted aspects 
of the majority and concurring opinions, perhaps the most 
powerful evidence of Brady’s anemic enforceability is the 
conclusion of Justices Scalia and Alito regarding the lab report. 
Their concurring opinion reasoned that the failure to disclose 
the lab report revealing the blood type of the LaGarde robber 
was probably not a Brady violation because prosecutors did not 
know John Thompson’s blood type.189 Notably, the opening lines 
of the relatively terse majority opinion also emphasized the 
absence of proof that prosecutors tested Thompson’s blood or 
“knew what his blood type was.”190 Justices Scalia and Alito 
went further. They denied awareness of any Supreme Court 
case law supporting what they described as the dissent’s “sub 
silentio expansion of the substantive law of Brady” to 
encompass a duty to reveal “untested” evidence that could 
exonerate a defendant.191  
To be fair, the concurrence tweaked the dissent for citing 
no case in which a Brady violation rests solely on a withheld lab 
report.192 Nevertheless, the fact that two United States Supreme 
Court Justices could view the lab report documenting the robber’s 
blood type as comprising untested evidence underscores the 
many profound problems undermining Brady enforceability. 
Similarly revealing is the concurring Justices’ citation of Arizona 
v. Youngblood193 to support their not-very-silentio 
circumscription of prosecutors’ constitutional disclosure duties to 
evidence that they subjectively know to be exculpatory. As the 
concurrence acknowledged, subjective knowledge is irrelevant to 
Brady analysis.194  
  
 188 See also id. at 1373 & n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that at the federal 
trial, the jury was told of the parties’ stipulation that the prosecution did not inform the 
defense “of the existence of the blood evidence, that the evidence had been tested, [or] that a 
blood type was determined definitively from the swatch” (emphasis added)). 
 189 Id. at 1369 (Scalia & Alito, JJ., concurring). 
 190 Id. at 1356 (majority opinion). 
 191 Id. at 1369 (Scalia & Alito, JJ., concurring). 
 192 Id. But see Joseph v. Whitley, No. 92-2335, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17385, 
at *5-12 (E.D. La. 1992) (Orleans Parish prosecutors failed to disclose blood samples 
and test results; undisclosed evidence held not to meet Brady’s materiality test.); State 
v. Walter, 675 So. 2d 831, 833-35 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (no abuse of discretion in denial of 
new trial after Orleans Parish prosecutors failed to disclose a lab report in time for the 
defense to investigate and use the information at trial). 
 193 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 
 194 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1369. 
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In fact, prosecutors’ disclosure duties were not squarely 
at issue in Youngblood. The case did not involve prosecutors’ 
deliberate suppression of biological evidence or nondisclosure of 
potentially exculpatory lab reports. The problem in Youngblood 
was the inability to test the biological evidence at issue (semen 
samples) because one set of samples was too small and 
investigators failed to preserve another sample for testing.195 
The Court’s chief concern in Youngblood was to avoid 
burdening the nation’s myriad law enforcement offices by 
imposing a due process duty to preserve potentially exculpatory 
evidence in all cases.196  
The citation of Youngblood by the Connick concurrence is 
a transitive error. A forensic sample that cannot be tested, like 
the semen in Youngblood, is distinguishable from the tested 
blood swatch in John Thompson’s case. The blood swatch tests 
yielded dispositive results. Those results were recorded in a lab 
report. The lab report revealed what the defense, with minimal 
investigation, could establish to be wholly exculpatory evidence.  
That type of tested forensic evidence and forensic report 
defines materiality under Brady. This is so in part because the 
full value of exculpatory evidence can only be determined ex 
post, in the context of an adequate defense opportunity to 
investigate and litigate its meaning at trial. Those opportunities 
were denied to both Youngblood and Thompson. But unlike 
Youngblood, Thompson’s only impediment to investigating and 
litigating the exculpatory value of the retained, tested evidence 
was the prosecution’s failure to disclose it. 
The concurrence failed to mention another reason that 
Youngblood supports rather than refutes Thompson’s position: 
Youngblood was innocent. Like Thompson, he was imprisoned 
for years before evidence of his wrongful convictions led to his 
release.197 In Youngblood’s case, it took fifteen years before 
advances in DNA technology allowed testing on the remnants 
of the biological evidence.198 Those tests led authorities to 
  
 195 488 U.S. at 53-54 (discussing trial court’s denial of state’s motion to test 
defendant’s blood and saliva because semen sample was inadequate for valid 
comparison); cf. State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 595-96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 
488 U.S. 51 (1988) (“This is not a case where the samples were available for 
defendant’s examination.”). But see State v. Youngblood, 844 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Ariz. 
1993) (semen sample “was available to the defendant at trial and the defendant chose 
not to perform tests of his own”). 
 196 Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. 
 197 Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost 
Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 243-44 nn.5-7 (2008). 
 198 Id. 
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identify and convict the child sex offender who had kidnapped 
and sodomized the ten-year-old victim.199 The silence of the 
Connick concurrence on the full story of Youngblood tracks the 
corresponding subordination by both the majority and the 
concurring opinions of the prosecutors’ core due process duties, 
developed from Mooney through Kyles, to speak truth and seek 
justice. The strained reasoning in those opinions with respect to 
the blood swatch, the lab report, and the undisclosed impeachment 
evidence significantly weakens Brady enforceability. The 
majority’s wink-and-nod to due process disclosure violations 
highlights the same majority’s elision of constitutional discovery 
duties in Garcetti.  
C. Garcetti v. Ceballos: Riding the Rims to the Junkyard Gate 
According to the defense attorneys for Michael Cuskey 
and Randy Longoria, the events that culminated in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos arose because 
Sheriff’s deputies in Pomona County, California lacked sufficient 
evidence to arrest Cuskey and Longoria for running a chop 
shop.200 After his arrest, Cuskey threw fuel on the fire by suing 
the Sheriff’s department.201 On this theory, when deputies spotted 
a stripped-down, stolen truck near Cuskey’s junkyard,202 they saw 
a chance to link the truck to the defendants. They asked their 
supervisor, Detective Wall, to obtain a warrant to search the 
junkyard.203 Based on the deputies’ statements, Wall swore out an 
affidavit describing “tire tracks which appeared to match the 
tread pattern” of the stolen truck leading to “the end of a long 
driveway” and the fence that marked Cuskey’s property line.204  
The magistrate issued the warrant. The deputies 
searched the property. They found no evidence to support their 
chop shop suspicions.205 But while the warrant focused on 
stolen vehicle parts, the deputies brought along a drug dog that 
sniffed out a small amount of methamphetamine.206 The 
  
 199 Id. 
 200 Joint App’x Vol. II at 346, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-
473), 2005 WL 1620384.  
 201 Id. at 238.  
 202 Id. at 257 (where court asked whether the property was a “junkyard,” one 
deputy demurred, “every man, it’s his castle,” but agreed “there were car parts on that 
property, there were birds, there were animals, there were refrigerators . . . all kinds of 
stuff,” including what “looked like an alligator . . . .”). 
 203 Joint App’x Vol. I at 28, Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1620385. 
 204 Joint App’x Vol. III at 497, Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1620386. 
 205 Id. at 498. 
 206 Id.  
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deputies also seized some firearms.207 Cuskey, Longoria, and a 
third defendant named Ojala were charged with felony drug 
and weapon possession offenses.208 Ojala pleaded guilty and 
began serving a one-year jail sentence.209  
Meanwhile, the lawyers for Cuskey and Longoria 
investigated the allegations in the search warrant. Based on 
that investigation, they alleged that the deputies had lied to 
obtain the affidavit. The junkyard was not at the end of a long 
driveway but on a road that was the length of a football field.210 
The road was thirty- to forty-feet wide, “equal to if not greater 
than a standard residential street.”211 At least nine other 
residences faced onto the same road; all of those homeowners 
had to use the road to enter and exit their properties.212 The 
road was made of asphalt, gravel, and dirt. There was 
“absolutely no way” tire-tread patterns could lead from the 
truck to Cuskey’s junkyard fence.213 In the one spot where tread 
marks appeared, it was “almost impossible” to tell from which 
of the ten properties they originated.214  
The defense lawyers filed a motion to traverse the 
warrant.215 If granted, the motion would have required 
dismissal of the charges.216 The defense lawyers gave their 
investigative materials to Richard Ceballos. As supervising 
prosecutor, Ceballos had authority to dismiss the case.217 
Ceballos investigated the defense allegations and consulted 
with supervisors and colleagues.218 All the prosecutors agreed 
“there was a problem with the warrant.”219  
Ceballos then talked with Detective Wall, the officer 
who had sworn out the affidavit supporting the warrant.220 
Ceballos confronted Wall with the defense allegations that the 
tire tread marks running from the truck to Cuskey’s gate were 
“a figment of the deputy’s imagination, that they had lied, that 
  
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. at 406. 
 209 Id. at 496. 
 210 Id. at 499. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id.  
 213 Id.  
 214 Id. at 500. 
 215 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 48; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1539 
(1985) (providing for hearing on motion controverting facts in warrant). 
 216 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 48. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. at 39. 
 220 Id. at 37. 
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they had made up the fact that they had seen these tire 
tracks.”221 Ceballos later told Wall that the charges would likely 
be dismissed because of the affidavit’s “grossly inaccurate” 
description of the road.222  
Wall then made a crucial admission. He told Ceballos 
that he had spoken to the deputies.223 He said that the affidavit 
should be “modified.”224 He wanted to change “tire tracks” to 
“‘tire gouges,’ caused by the rims of the stolen truck scraping 
along the roadway.”225 Ceballos asked when the officers decided 
to modify the affidavit. Wall did not answer.226 Ceballos wrote a 
memorandum recommending dismissal of the charges based on 
the misrepresentations and omissions in the affidavit.227 He 
cited Franks v. Delaware in support.228  
Franks allows Fourth Amendment challenges to the 
veracity of affiants’ statements supporting warrants.229 The 
Franks Court reasoned that probable cause “would be reduced 
to a nullity” if an officer could use false evidence to obtain a 
warrant and “remain confident that the ploy” could never be 
exposed through the adversarial process.230 Given the 
magistrate’s constitutional duties, the Court concluded, “it 
would be an unthinkable imposition upon his authority if a 
warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a 
  
 221 Id. 
 222 Joint App’x Vol. III, supra note 204, at 502. 
 223 Id. at 503.  
 224 Id.  
 225 Id.  
 226 Id. The issue arose a few months after the Rampart investigation revealed 
large-scale corruption, including perjury, evidence planting, drug dealing, violent crimes, 
and other misconduct by the Los Angeles police department’s anti-gang unit. Erwin 
Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Board of 
Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 547-53 (as revised 
2005). As the district court put it in ruling on Ceballos’s subsequent civil rights claim:  
[T]he code word “Rampart” says it all—there can be no doubt that, in 
Southern California, police misconduct is a matter of great political and 
social concern to the community. In recent years, various local law 
enforcement agencies have been severely criticized for what many believe to 
be serious misconduct on the part of police officers.  
Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV 00-11106 AHM (AJWx), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039, at 
*15 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002).  
 227 Joint App’x Vol. III, supra note 204, at 503 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154 (1978)). 
 228 Id.  
 229 Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. 
 230 Id. at 168. 
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deliberately or recklessly false statement, were to stand beyond 
impeachment.”231 
Franks challenges are equivalent to perjury allegations 
against law enforcement officers. Such challenges seldom 
succeed.232 In the rare cases in which Franks relief is granted, 
however, it is based on the type of prevarication documented in 
Ceballos’s memorandum.233 Ceballos’s supervisor was 
concerned enough about the affidavit’s veracity that he 
authorized the release of the third defendant, who was already 
serving time on his guilty plea.234 But the supervisor also asked 
Ceballos to revise the memo. He wanted to give the Sheriff’s 
department a less accusatory explanation for dismissing the 
charges.235  
Although Ceballos edited the memo as requested, the 
deputies still accused him of acting like a defense lawyer. They 
worried that dismissal might give Cuskey grounds for another 
lawsuit.236 Ceballos’s supervisor decided against dismissing the 
charges. He chose instead to leave any decision on the Franks 
allegations to the “black robe” presiding over the suppression 
hearing.237  
Before the Franks hearing, but after consulting with his 
supervisors, Ceballos gave a redacted version of his memo to 
  
 231 Id. at 165. Further research is needed to trace the extent to which a 
concern to protect the court’s integrity connects doctrines underlying Brady, Franks, 
and “fraud on the court” analyses. For a definition of the latter allegation, see, for 
example, Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2005) (defining 
“demanding” burden of proving fraud on the court by “clear, unequivocal and 
convincing evidence” of intentional and successful deception of the court through “the 
most egregious conduct” by an officer of the court). 
 232 See generally Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police 
Reform: Using Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. 
L. REV. 351, 363-65, 367 & nn.44-58 & 70 (2011) (describing causes and consequences 
of law enforcement perjury, or “testilying”). 
 233 United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614, 624 (7th Cir. 2001) (remanding 
case to determine if search warrant was deficient when officers altered versions of 
events and facts did not match description); United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 
774-75 (8th Cir. 2001) (approving trial court’s refusal to “bolster” affidavit with new 
and different information beneficial to the prosecution); United States v. DeLeon, 979 
F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1992) (remanding case due to material omissions in affidavit). 
 234 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 42-44.  
 235 Id. at 113-18.  
 236 Id. at 49.  
 237 Id. at 117-18. Another supervisor reviewed the affidavit and the results of 
Ceballos’s investigation. He agreed that the affidavit contained “obvious material 
misrepresentations and omissions per Franks v. Delaware.” Joint App’x Vol. III, supra 
note 204, at 411-12. After the meeting, Ceballos confronted his supervisor about 
“kowtowing to the sheriff’s department, of ignoring the fact that these deputy sheriffs 
had lied, and of setting aside his obligations simply to appease the sheriff’s captain and 
lieutenant.” Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 23. 
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the defense.238 He also insisted that he would have to testify for 
the defense if subpoenaed.239 His immediate supervisor warned 
that if he kept “thinking . . . [and] talking like that” he would 
get “in trouble.”240 Ceballos interpreted this warning as an 
attempt to dissuade him from testifying and as a threat to 
retaliate if he did so.241 He received the defense subpoena and 
decided that “regardless of the consequences” he was going to 
“tell the truth” at the suppression hearing.242 
Ceballos was not allowed to testify to his own 
conclusions about the deputies’ veracity. But he did testify that 
the deputies wanted to change the affidavit.243 Although the 
affidavit specifically stated that the deputies had followed “tire 
tracks matching the tread pattern” of the stolen truck, the 
deputies testified differently at the hearing. There, they 
described tracing a “scratch” or “indentation” made by a tire 
rim from the stolen truck to Cuskey’s gate.  
Ceballos knew the presiding judge as “a good judge for 
prosecutors.”244 The judge recited the affidavit’s “specific” 
description of each of the truck’s four tires.245 The judge was 
unmoved by the affidavit’s failure to mention any flat tire or 
rim.246 He was similarly unmoved by disparities between the 
deputies’ descriptions of the flat tire.247 He credited the 
deputies’ testimony and denied the defense motion.248  
Shortly thereafter, Ceballos was demoted.249 He also was 
taken off a murder case and offered “freeway therapy” (a 
different job with a long commute).250 He exhausted the available 
grievance process and filed his civil rights action.251 He urged 
that his conduct was required by Brady v. Maryland and that 
his supervisors’ retaliation violated the First Amendment and 
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.252 
  
 238 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 56.  
 239 Id. at 57. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. at 58. 
 242 Id. at 58-59. 
 243 Joint App’x Vol. II, supra note 200, at 297-308.  
 244 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 60. 
 245 Joint App’x Vol. II, supra note 200, at 349 (“emergency tires . . . on the 
right front and left rear . . . a white spoke type wheel with a Sonic brand . . . on the left 
front . . . a Firestone . . . on the right rear”).  
 246 Id. at 348-49. 
 247 Id.  
 248 Id. 
 249 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 12-13. 
 250 Id. at 13.  
 251 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 415 (2006). 
 252 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 139-40. 
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D. Brady Duties in the Pretrial Context 
With the core meanings of Brady-line duties firmly 
rooted in the mandate to speak truth and seek justice, 
Ceballos’s constitutional duty to speak out as he did might 
seem obvious. Contrary to the Supreme Court majority opinion, 
Ceballos did not write his memorandum because “he did not 
receive a satisfactory explanation for the perceived 
inaccuracies” in the affidavit.253 His independent investigation 
of the defense allegations confirmed that the affidavit could not 
be true. He confronted the lead detective and was told the 
sworn affidavit should be “modified.”254 Ceballos was not alone 
in concluding that this admission supported the perjury 
allegation and that he had a duty to turn the information over 
to the defense.255  
The first set of federal judges to consider the issue 
agreed that Ceballos had a duty to inform his supervisors 
about what he had learned. The district court judge cited Brady 
to hold that when Ceballos wrote his memorandum, “he was 
complying with his (and the government’s) duties under the 
due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
not to introduce or rely on evidence known to be false.”256 On 
appeal, two Ninth Circuit judges concluded that, taking the 
evidence in a light most favorable to Ceballos, his 
memorandum comprised “[g]ood-faith statements made in 
pursuit of [the] obligation” imposed upon prosecutors by their 
“duty to disclose information favorable to an accused, including 
information relating to a witness’s veracity and integrity.”257 
The concurring judge also viewed the memorandum as 
performing “the basic communicative duty Brady imposes on 
‘the prosecution.’ . . . Ceballos was simply ‘doing what he was 
supposed to do’ as a deputy district attorney carrying out non-
discretionary quintessentially ‘prosecutorial functions.’”258 
The district court and Ninth Circuit drew upon the 
parties’ pleadings and summary judgment arguments. But if 
  
 253 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414. 
 254 Joint App’x Vol. III, supra note 204, at 503. 
 255 Id. at 411-12 (memorandum of Deputy District Attorney Michael Grosbard, 
concluding that Franks required disclosure of investigators’ “obvious material 
misrepresentations and omissions”); Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (“[A] prosecutor 
anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence.”). 
 256 Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV 00-11106 AHM (AJWx), 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28039, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002). 
 257 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 258 Id. at 1189 & n.3 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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(as it appears) the lawyers and judges were relying on the four 
corners of the Supreme Court’s Brady-line jurisprudence as the 
basis for Ceballos’s constitutional disclosure duty, they were 
overreaching. From Mooney through Kyles, the Supreme Court 
has consistently emphasized that constitutional criminal 
discovery duties and rights protect interests in a fair trial.259 None 
of the Supreme Court’s Brady-line cases impose a constitutional 
disclosure duty upon prosecutors in the pretrial setting.  
To the contrary, by the time Ceballos wrote his 
memorandum, the Court had held that prosecutors have no 
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence before a defendant is 
indicted, at least in the specialized setting of the grand jury 
hearing.260 In dicta in United States v. Agurs, the Court also 
had indicated that there was no pretrial disclosure duty by 
stating that prosecutors could reveal Brady information 
“during the course of a trial.”261 The federal courts of appeals 
have generally agreed that prosecutors can wait until quite late 
in the game to comply with constitutionally mandated 
disclosure duties—even after defense cross-examination of a 
prosecution witness.262  
The litigants and the courts in Ceballos’s case were 
silent on the significance of this doctrinal problem in applying 
Brady to the disclosures prompted by Cuskey’s motion to 
traverse. On one hand, such silence may not have been wholly 
inappropriate. Ceballos had evidence indicating that law 
enforcement officers committed perjury. There were two 
opportunities for that evidence to have any meaningful effect: 
the memorandum recommending dismissal and, absent 
dismissal, the Franks hearing on the motion to traverse the 
warrant. On those facts, the core constitutional meaning of due 
process disclosure duties—speaking truth, seeking justice, 
disclosing material exculpatory and impeachment evidence—
could have trumped the absence of any binding Supreme Court 
precedent on the need for pretrial disclosure.  
On the other hand, the silence of the litigants and 
courts on the unsettled timing-of-disclosure doctrine may 
indicate inattention. A few weeks before the district court ruled 
  
 259 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1976). 
 260 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). 
 261 427 U.S. at 107. 
 262 United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting 
United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (1983)); see also United States v. Burke, 571 
F.3d 1048, 1053-56 (10th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases, requiring proof of prejudice from 
belated disclosure).  
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on the summary judgment motions in Ceballos’s case, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in another Ninth Circuit 
case, United States v. Ruiz.263 That case raised the question 
whether Brady requires disclosure of impeachment evidence 
during plea bargaining.264 A few months later, and nearly two 
years before the Ninth Circuit ruled in Ceballos’s case, a 
unanimous Court held that no such duty exists.265 Since Ruiz 
arguably had implications for prosecutors’ pretrial disclosure 
duties beyond the plea bargaining context—potentially 
weakening Ceballos’s civil rights claim—one would reasonably 
expect to see some evidence that those implications were 
considered, had the litigants or judges done so.  
This deepening silence raises the question whether any 
federal constitutional precedent imposed a specific disclosure 
obligation on Ceballos, in addition to his core due process 
duties to speak truth and seek justice, in the context of a 
pretrial Franks hearing. Although no court or commentator has 
discussed this question, the answer is yes. 
In 1993—after the Supreme Court held that no 
disclosure duty applied in the grand jury setting, but long 
before Cuskey’s defense lawyer challenged Detective Wall’s 
affidavit—the Ninth Circuit became the only jurisdiction in the 
country to impose Brady-line disclosure duties on prosecutors 
in the latter, pretrial setting of a motion to traverse.266 In 
United States v. Barton, the defendant argued that his Brady 
rights were violated when law enforcement officers let his 
marijuana plants rot in their evidence locker.267 Detectives had 
seized the marijuana pursuant to a warrant.268 They obtained 
the warrant by swearing in an affidavit that they had smelled 
marijuana at Barton’s house.269 Barton challenged the truth of 
  
 263 534 U.S. 1074 (2002) (granting certiorari Jan. 4, 2002).  
 264 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002). 
 265 Id. at 630-33. Specifically, the Ruiz Court held that due process does not 
bar requirements that defendants waive their rights to impeachment evidence as a 
condition of accepting a plea bargain; such a waiver does not render the plea 
involuntary. Id. at 630, 633.  
 266 United States v. Barton, 995 F.2d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 1993); cf. Mays v. City 
of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 816 (6th Cir. 1998) (where a Franks challenge alleges 
omission of disputed facts from warrant affidavit, defendants must make “a strong 
preliminary showing that the affiant with an intention to mislead excluded critical 
information from the affidavit, and the omission is critical to the finding of probable 
cause”). But see United States v. Stott, 245 F.3d 890, 902-03 & n.9 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(applying plain error analysis and finding no clear rule that Brady applies to 
suppression hearings; collecting cases). 
 267 995 F.2d at 932. 
 268 Id.  
 269 Id.  
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that statement. He argued that only marijuana plants with 
glandular trichomes emit any odor.270 Had his plants been 
preserved, he urged, he could have impeached the detectives 
with evidence that his plants had no glandular trichomes and 
were therefore odorless.271  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Barton’s 
suppression motion.272 The panel reasoned that Barton failed to 
prove officers destroyed the plants in bad faith. But to reach 
that issue, the court first extended Brady protections to the 
pretrial setting of a Franks hearing.273 The panel concluded 
that, by violating due process discovery duties (in Barton, 
through destruction of material impeachment evidence), an 
agent of the prosecution “could feel secure that false allegations 
in his or her affidavit for a search warrant could not be 
challenged . . . [and] effectively deprive a criminal defendant of 
his Fourth Amendment right to challenge the validity of a 
search warrant.”274  
Excavating the due process disclosure rights and duties 
in Ceballos’s case leads to a previously unremarked and precise 
core constitutional meaning. At least in jurisdictions within the 
Ninth Circuit, prosecutors must seek justice, speak truth, and 
disclose material exculpatory and impeachment evidence—
including when defendants challenge the veracity of affidavits 
supporting search warrants.275  
E. Discovery Duties Diminished 
The Supreme Court’s five-member majority held that 
Ceballos had no First Amendment protection against retaliation 
for writing the memorandum recommending dismissal of the 
charges against Cuskey and Longoria because he conceded that 
such activity was part of his official duties as a government 
  
 270 Id. at 933. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. at 936. 
 273 Id. at 934-35 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156, 168 (1978)). 
 274 Id. at 935. 
 275 See United States v. Welton, No. CR 09-00153, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
71509, at *27 & n.33 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2009) (stating that Barton remains “law of the 
circuit” post-Ruiz; collecting cases on imposition of Brady-line duties pretrial), aff’d on 
other grounds, 438 F. App’x 555, 556 (9th Cir. 2011); State v. Lewis, No. 31684, 2006 
Ida. App. LEXIS 19, at *10, *14-15 (Feb. 13, 2006) (applying Barton to reverse grant of 
motion to suppress due to lack of proof that officer destroyed exculpatory audiotape in 
bad faith), aff’d, 156 P.3d 565, 569 (Idaho 2007).  
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employee.276 I will not recanvass the abundant commentary277 on 
what even the apparently lone scholarly supporter of Garcetti 
concedes to be the opinion’s undertheorized treatment of First 
Amendment workplace rights for government employees.278 The 
majority’s reasoning is formalistic and syllogistic. Ceballos 
recorded the Brady information in a charge disposition 
memorandum. Ceballos conceded that it was part of his job 
duties to produce charge disposition memoranda. The First 
Amendment does not protect communications that are part of a 
government employee’s job duties. Therefore, the First 
Amendment did not protect Ceballos from retaliation for 
writing his memorandum. 
Concerns about federalism, separation of powers, and 
administrative efficiency played a strong role in Garcetti’s 
outcome. Those concerns rise to a peak in federal civil rights 
actions seeking oversight of local criminal justice systems. 
Garcetti also is part of a long and more particular trend toward 
concentration of power in, and deference to, the prosecution 
function as an administrative entity. Granting the effect of 
those concerns in Garcetti, the case carries important 
implications for prosecutors’ constitutional discovery duties—
which, in the view of all of the lower federal court judges, 
required Ceballos to act as he did. The California Prosecutors 
Association and the Association of Deputy District Attorneys of 
  
 276 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-24 (2006). The Court did not 
address issues of qualified immunity. It would appear that the disclosure duty in the 
context of Cuskey’s Franks hearing was “clearly established” for purposes of section 
1983 qualified immunity analysis under Barton. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 
(1999) (to establish defendant duty, plaintiffs may cite “controlling authority in their 
jurisdiction at the time of the incident which clearly established the rule on which they 
seek to rely”); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.32 (1982) (declining to 
determine “the circumstances under which ‘the state of the law’ should be ‘evaluated by 
reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District 
Court’” (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (reviewing federal 
district court and court of appeals decisions to determine whether the right at issue 
was “clearly established”))); Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he 
court must determine whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court or the 
appropriate circuit court has clearly established the right in question.”); see also Karen 
M. Blum, The Qualified Immunity Defense: What’s “Clearly Established” and What’s 
Not, 24 TOURO L. REV. 501, 515 (2008) (“controlling authority from the jurisdiction—
that circuit’s court of appeals or the highest court of the state in which the case was 
sitting” may show law is “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes). 
 277 See Tarkington, supra note 22, at 2176 & n.5 (citing scholarly commentary). 
 278 Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 38. Rosenthal contends that Garcetti adopted 
“much the same position” that he argued successfully in Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 
239 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2001). Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 33 n.1. But see Elizabeth 
Dale, Employee Speech and Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 194 & nn.133-36 (2008) 
(arguing for a more limited reading of Gonzalez and Garcetti).  
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Los Angeles County urged the same position as amici before 
the Supreme Court. They begged the Court to protect 
prosecutors’ good-faith compliance with due process discovery 
duties.279 Yet the Justices gave the issue little attention. With 
few exceptions,280 scholars have followed suit.  
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Garcetti never 
referred directly to prosecutors’ constitutional discovery duties. 
A single citation to Brady v. Maryland was sandwiched 
between the opinion’s penultimate closing lines.281 Those lines 
referenced “safeguards in the form of . . . constitutional 
obligations apart from the First Amendment” and an assurance 
that such “imperatives . . . protect employees and provide 
checks on supervisors who would order unlawful or otherwise 
inappropriate actions.”282 The majority opinion was silent on 
Ceballos’s claim that it was precisely this imperative that 
required him to act as he did, and yet failed to protect him from 
alleged retaliation—an allegation that, like all other aspects of 
his complaint, had to be construed with every inference in his 
favor at the summary judgment stage.283 
Justice Stevens’s short dissenting opinion made no 
mention of prosecutors’ due process disclosure duties.284 Justice 
Souter’s dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg joined, attributed to Ceballos the constitutionally 
protected “interest of any citizen in speaking out against a 
rogue law enforcement officer.”285 But these dissenters also 
viewed the interest at stake as that of a First Amendment right 
exercised by a government employee. Therefore, Ceballos’s free 
speech interest had to be balanced against a set of powerful 
competing interests.286 These dissenters would have weighed 
Ceballos’s interest in his favor only if his comments addressed 
“official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other 
serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety.”287  
But Justice Souter’s dissent went further. That opinion 
defined Ceballos’s official duties as a prosecutor in a way that 
  
 279 Brief of Ass’n of Deputy Dist. Attorneys & Cal. Prosecutors Ass’n as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondent, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473). 
 280 Tarkington, supra note 22, at 2178 & n.13 (responding to Rosenthal, supra 
note 22, at 56-57). 
 281 Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 425. 
 282 Id. at 425-46. 
 283 Id. at 442 & n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). 
 284 Id. at 426-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 285 Id. at 431 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 286 Id. at 419-20 (majority opinion). 
 287 Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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could entail something more than the First Amendment 
interest of “any citizen.” Ceballos’s job was “to enforce the law 
by constitutional action” and “to exercise the county 
government’s prosecutorial power by acting honestly, 
competently, and constitutionally.”288 Justice Souter’s dissent 
also cited Ceballos’s allegation that Brady required him to 
disclose the memorandum to the defense as exculpatory 
evidence.289 Finally, this opinion noted, Ceballos’s “claim 
relating to [his own] truthful testimony in court must surely be 
analyzed independently [of the other aspects of his claim] to 
protect the integrity of the judicial process.”290 These 
statements marked a path toward relief for Ceballos on 
remand.291  
Justice Souter’s opinion offered no substantive analysis of 
the constitutional doctrine that allegedly compelled Ceballos to 
ensure, among other things, that the judge considering Cuskey’s 
motion to traverse heard “truthful testimony.” In the lone opinion 
viewing Ceballos’s due process disclosure duties as dispositive, 
Justice Breyer’s dissent added little doctrinal analysis to Justice 
Souter’s. He would have held that Ceballos had a protectable 
First Amendment interest because, as a general matter, Ceballos 
was engaged in “professional speech—the speech of a lawyer,” 
and because, as a prosecutor, he had more specific speech 
obligations imposed by the Brady doctrine.292 In Justice Breyer’s 
view, those twin circumstances vested a First Amendment 
interest in Ceballos’s production of the memorandum because 
they simultaneously increased the need to protect the speech at 
issue, reduced government interests in controlling the speech, 
and lowered the risk of inefficiencies and overreaching that 
might occur through judicial trenching on managerial authority 
in the government workplace.293 
  
 288 Id. at 437. 
 289 Id. at 442. 
 290 Id. at 444. Justice Souter’s opinion stated that Ceballos’s testimony at the 
motion hearing “stopped short of his own conclusions” that the deputies lied. Id. at 442. 
This was so because the judge sustained the prosecution’s objections to that testimony. 
Joint App’x Vol. III, supra note 204, at 298-303. 
 291 The case settled shortly after the Supreme Court remanded the case. 
Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV 00-11106 AHM (AJWx), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002). Orly Lobel reported that, although the terms of the 
agreement are not public, “the settlement may have been very favorable for Ceballos.” 
Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping 
Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 454 & n.125 (2009).  
 292 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 446-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 293 Id.  
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With respect to the professional speech prong of Justice 
Breyer’s test, Margaret Tarkington has supplied much of the 
doctrinal analysis missing from his cursory dissenting 
opinion.294 Tarkington also is one of the few scholars to discuss 
the facts and law that gave rise to Ceballos’s disclosure duties. 
Her work points to the core piece of Brady evidence in the case: 
Ceballos’s two conversations with “the police affiant for the 
warrant” mentioned in the majority opinion.295  
Those conversations comprised Ceballos’s confrontation 
of Detective Wall with evidence that the affidavit contained 
falsehoods as well as Wall’s subsequent admission about 
needing to change the affidavit.296 That evidence had both 
exculpatory and impeachment value. First, it tended to show 
that the truck could not be traced to Cuskey’s junkyard. 
Second, it cast doubt on the investigating officers’ veracity. 
Because the evidence called key components of the state’s case 
into question, Ceballos’s investigation and Wall’s admission 
constituted Brady material, inaccessible to the defense unless 
the prosecution complied with the constitutional duty to turn it 
over.297 Unsurprisingly, Ceballos, his supervisors, the federal 
District Court judge, three Circuit Court judges, and Justice 
Breyer all agreed on this point.298 The puzzle remains: why was 
  
 294 Tarkington, supra note 22. For California authorities governing Ceballos’s 
conduct, see People v. Davis, 309 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1957) (in reference to defense attorney 
speech, stating that “counsel may not offer testimony of a witness which he knows to be 
untrue” since “[t]o do so may constitute subornation of perjury”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 6068(d) (2011) (attorneys have duty to employ “those means only as are 
consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by 
an artifice or false statement of fact or law”).  
 295 Tarkington, supra note 22, at 2178 & n.13 (“Ceballos, a member of the 
prosecution, talked twice with the police affiant for the warrant” (citing Garcetti, 547 
U.S. at 414 (majority opinion))). 
 296 See supra notes 220-28 and accompanying text. 
 297 Without accounting for the impeachment value of the officers’ admissions 
or the opinions of Ceballos’s supervisors, the lower court judges, and Justice Breyer 
that Ceballos had a constitutional disclosure duty, Professor Rosenthal reached the 
opposite conclusion. See Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 56-57. An experienced prosecutor 
and admitted advocate for the “managerial prerogatives” vindicated in Garcetti, id. at 
33, Rosenthal is alone among commentators in acknowledging the relevance of Franks 
v. Delaware to the case. Id. at 40 & n.11. He also acknowledged prosecutors’ duties to 
obtain and disclose Brady evidence held by law enforcement, id. at 56 & n.72, and 
concluded that prosecutors must be protected against retaliation for good-faith 
compliance with Brady-line disclosure duties. Id. at 67-68. He might concede that, 
regardless of the outcome at the motion hearing, the impeachment value of Wall’s 
admission supported a good-faith belief in the prosecutors’ constitutional duty to 
disclose it, and agree to the improbability that the officers would have volunteered that 
evidence to the defense lawyers who had publicly accused them of misleading or lying 
to a magistrate.  
 298 On the correlation of duties and rights, see generally, Osborn v. Bank of 
United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824) (“It is not unusual for a legislative act to involve 
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this duty given such short shrift by the Justices and the 
majority of commentators?  
To be sure, the plaintiff’s pleadings and argument did 
not point the Court toward Ceballos’s disclosure duty under 
Barton.299 But it is hardly satisfactory to blame the relatively 
thin summary judgment record for the almost complete silence 
on the core due process principles implicated by the alleged 
facts. The case was argued twice. The Court had the benefit of 
several amicus briefs. Nor does it seem likely that the Justices 
gave Ceballos’s due process duties short shrift because the trial 
judge, in denying the Franks motion, effectively ruled that he 
had no duty to reveal evidence of police perjury.300 Brady 
materiality is determined ex post by estimating the cumulative 
value that withheld evidence would have had if the defense had 
been able to use it. The rejection of a Brady claim does not 
reach back to eliminate a prosecutor’s duty to reveal potentially 
exculpatory evidence in time for the defense to incorporate it 
into the case investigation and litigation. To the contrary, 
Brady requires disclosure, even in close cases, to prevent 
prosecutors from “tacking too close to the wind” and infecting 
criminal adjudications with unfairness and unreliability.301 
Ceballos’s commitment to protecting the integrity of the 
judicial process appears to have been in good faith; he was 
willing to sacrifice his career for it.  
Nor does it solve the puzzle to insist that the case is 
really about government employee speech under the First 
Amendment and not about due process discovery duties. On 
that point, it is noteworthy that the Garcetti majority did not 
adopt the view of the District Court and the Court of Appeals’ 
concurring opinion302 that Ceballos had no protectable interest 
in his communication precisely because his speech was required 
  
consequences which are not expressed. An officer, for example, is ordered to arrest an 
individual. It is not necessary, nor is it usual, to say that he shall not be punished for 
obeying this order. His security is implied in the order itself. . . . [T]he judicial power is 
the instrument employed by the government in administering this security.”); Brewer 
v. Hoxie Sch. Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91, 100 (8th Cir. 1956) (granting injunction 
restraining anti-desegregationists’ interference with plaintiff school board directors’ 
attempts to comply with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); id. (“[T]he 
existence of a Constitutional duty also presupposes a correlative right in the person upon 
whom the duty is imposed to be free from direct interference with its performance.”).  
 299 At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel urged that government employees have 
a First Amendment right to speak on any topic that is newsworthy. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 48-50, Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 (No. 04-473) [hereinafter 2005 Transcript]. 
 300 But see Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 45. 
 301 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995). 
 302 See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.  
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by due process disclosure doctrine. That logic, like the Supreme 
Court majority’s, was syllogistic—but more sweeping.  
On the reasoning of the lower courts, Ceballos had no 
First Amendment protection against retaliation for performing 
his job duties. Those duties included notifying his superiors of 
the Brady information in Cuskey’s case. Therefore, Ceballos 
had no First Amendment protection against retaliation for 
communicating Brady information to his superiors. This 
reading of Ceballos’s due process disclosure duties submerges 
them within First Amendment doctrine. In turn, constitutional 
protection against retaliation for prosecutors who comply in 
good faith with Brady-line obligations sinks out of sight.  
But the Supreme Court majority did not ride that wake 
(at least not to its most extreme conclusion) despite being urged 
to do so at oral argument.303 Instead, the majority focused 
exclusively on the form, not the content, of Ceballos’s 
memorandum. For the majority, it was the act of writing such 
memoranda, more than the content, that erased Ceballos’s free 
speech rights.304 With respect to the content of the 
memorandum, the majority threw due process disclosure duties 
what turns out to be, on closer analysis, a slender lifeline. The 
majority cited Brady not as the basis for submerging due process 
protections under First Amendment doctrine, but as 
exemplifying constitutional “safeguards” and “imperatives” that 
“protect employees and provide checks on supervisors who would 
order unlawful or otherwise inappropriate actions.”305 Those 
lines trace back to exchanges during oral argument hinting that 
Ceballos had his own due process interest at stake.306  
One interpretation of the majority opinion is that 
prosecutors’ truth-telling and justice-seeking duties are so 
fundamental to the proper functioning of justice systems that 
they comprise bedrock due process components warranting 
protection independent of the First Amendment. The majority’s 
implicit retention of independent due process protections on the 
facts alleged indicates that, even under a First Amendment-
dominant analysis, Ceballos’s federal constitutional obligation 
to speak might have changed the outcome in the case had the 
litigants focused closely on the core due process principles at 
issue and their precise applications to the facts of the case 
  
 303 2005 Transcript, supra note 299, at 19-20. 
 304 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425-26 (2006). 
 305 Id. 
 306 2005 Transcript, supra note 299, at 22-24. 
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under Franks and Barton. As discussed above, it is possible 
that the failure to undertake this analysis resulted from 
inattention. It is also possible that, had Ceballos’s constitutional 
duties been fully fleshed out, a majority might nevertheless have 
subordinated those duties to internal management interests. 
The Court might have declined to identify a due process right to 
be free from retaliation for complying with Brady in the context 
of internal agency communication. The Court might have held 
that a federal appellate court decision such as Barton does not 
clearly establish a right or duty for purposes of a claim filed 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
But assuming that the due process lifeline traced here 
has some strength, focusing on core meanings in the context of 
the specific constitutional rights and duties implicated in 
Garcetti might have pulled Ceballos’s claim safely ashore. The 
claim could have rested directly in due process or undergone 
the more complex move from due process through the First and 
Fourth Amendments and back again. In either case, the due 
process analysis would dominate. But certainly for Richard 
Ceballos, Barton reinforced the core Brady duties to disclose 
Detective Wall’s statement. The duty triggered a corresponding 
right to disclose the information without retaliation.307 Indeed, 
as even Ceballos’s supervisors acknowledged, the entire office 
shared the same disclosure duty.308 Any remaining adjudicative 
work would comprise fact-based determinations to be resolved 
on remand, including the credibility of defense denials that any 
retaliation occurred.  
IV. FULL OPEN FILE DISCOVERY AS A MODEL FOR REFORM 
A. Opening the Black Box: Law, Politics, and Bureaucracy 
in the Regulation of Prosecutorial Decision Making 
The Supreme Court acknowledged more than a decade 
ago that open file discovery can “increase the efficiency and the 
fairness of the criminal process.”309 The same concerns animate 
Brady-line requirements for prosecutors and investigative 
  
 307 See supra note 298. 
 308 See supra note 255. 
 309 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.23 (1999); see also Jennifer 
Blasser, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations and Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1962, 
1968 (2010) (citing general agreement among symposium attendees that justice is best 
served when defense counsel has information “useful” for case assessment, 
investigation, and trial as well as for client communication). 
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agencies to disclose information beneficial to the defense.310 
Providing defendants with information obtained through 
government’s superior investigative resources levels the playing 
field. Fact finders make better decisions when adversaries 
present their strongest admissible evidence in the most 
compelling manner. The finality of reliable verdicts increases 
public confidence in the transparency and accountability of 
adjudicatory systems. Finality and reliability also reduce the 
significant costs resulting from alleged and actual error in 
criminal cases—costs borne by defendants, crime victims and 
survivors, their families, and the taxpayers who support 
prosecutors, public defenders, courts, and prisons.311 
Implementation and expansion of full open file criminal 
discovery provides an effective model for vindicating the 
foregoing interests. The statutes are short and simple. 
Prosecutors must provide the complete investigative files, 
including any material obtained by law enforcement, to the 
defense before trial.312 A file includes investigators’ notes, all 
oral statements (which are required to be recorded), and any 
other information obtained during the investigation.313 Oral 
statements need not be signed or adopted by potential 
witnesses to fall under the discovery requirement.314 Work 
product privileges are narrowed to “protect the prosecuting 
attorney’s mental processes while allowing the defendant 
access to factual information collected by the state.”315 
Reciprocal discovery of specified material by the defense to the 
prosecution is mandated.316 Ex parte motions to restrict 
disclosure are allowed where necessary to prevent any 
“substantial risk to any person” of harm, intimidation, or even 
“unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment.”317 Willful violation 
of the statute is punishable as a felony.318 
  
 310 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
 311 For data on prison costs alone, see, for example, Justice Reinvestment: Facts 
and Trends, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT, http://justicereinvestment.org/facts_and_trends 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2012). 
 312 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (2012).  
 313 Id. § 15A-903(a)(1). Particularly as modified by the 2011 amendments, the 
unique combination of provisions in the North Carolina statutes qualify that state’s 
reform as “full” open file discovery. Mosteller, supra note 5, at 263.  
 314 State v. Shannon, 642 S.E.2d 516, 523 (N.C. Ct. App.), review granted, 649 
S.E.2d 893 (N.C.), petition withdrawn, 654 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. 2007). 
 315 Shannon, 642 S.E.2d at 525 (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-904 and 
quoting JOHN RUBIN, N.C. INST. OF GOV’T, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 8 (2006)). 
 316 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-905 to -906 (2012). 
 317 Id. § 15A-908. 
 318 Id. § 15A-903(d). 
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The readily available empirical evidence—including 
case law, legislative history, and observations of some key 
stakeholders—demonstrates that full open file discovery reform 
can succeed. The history of full open file reform also illustrates 
that litigation and legislation are viable strategies for 
regulating prosecutors’ discretionary decision making.319 That 
evidence is significant because full open file reform can help 
prevent debacles like John Thompson’s convictions and 
incarceration, protect prosecutors like Richard Ceballos from 
retaliation for complying with disclosure duties, and increase 
the fairness, finality, and efficiency of criminal litigation.320  
Yet despite the number and magnitude of restrictions 
inhibiting enforcement of Brady-line duties; despite the 
documented link between disclosure violations and wrongful 
convictions;321 despite the Supreme Court’s implicit 
acknowledgement that resources are wasted in litigating 
pretrial discovery motions and postconviction Brady claims;322 
and despite the unfairness and uncertainty that the Brady 
regime creates for defendants, victims, and their families, full 
open file discovery remains a rarity in the United States. Reform 
on this front lags even as years of dogged litigation and media 
attention spur cures—including passage of model uniform 
statutes—for the mistaken eyewitness identifications, false 
confessions, and flawed forensic analysis that also contribute to 
unfair, unreliable, and inefficient outcomes in criminal cases.323  
Full open file discovery reform also has received little 
scholarly attention.324 Commentators have generally followed 
the courts in deferring to prosecutors, and any internal 
administrative changes they may choose to make in governing 
their own discretionary decision making, as the optimal 
prophylaxis against improper nondisclosure and its attendant 
costs. In its strongest recent iteration, this trend expressly 
despairs of litigation and legislation as effective avenues for 
criminal justice reform, at least with respect to the 
prosecutorial function. Miller and Wright’s Black Box325 is 
  
 319 See Mosteller, supra note 5, at 306-16. 
 320 Id. 
 321 See supra note 1. 
 322 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.23 (1999). 
 323 See supra note 30. 
 324 Exceptions include Mosteller, supra note 5. Other scholars recommending 
open file reform include Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. 
L.J. 481 (2009); Medwed, supra note 98, at 1557-66 (noting benefits and risks); and 
Richard Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 271-73. 
 325 Miller & Wright, supra note 29.  
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exemplary. Miller and Wright argue that development of 
internal data collection protocols is the best, if not the only 
mechanism for regulating prosecutorial discretion.326 They cite 
Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr. as an 
example of such internal reform.327  
The citation carries a Niebuhrian irony.328 On one hand, 
the Black Box embodies the opacity of discretionary decision 
making by the most powerful players in criminal justice 
systems.329 Miller and Wright cogently argue that data 
collection, assessment, and reporting can open this Black Box 
and bring greater transparency and accountability to charging 
decisions, including the identification and correction of any 
intentional or unconscious racial bias.330 But bureaucratic 
reform is no panacea. For example, Daniel Richman cautions 
that Connick’s charge-screening reform was, on closer analysis, 
“more like a case study in institutional disarray.”331 And 
Pamela Metzger reveals that, even pre-Katrina, Orleans Parish 
defendants were jailed without counsel for weeks under local 
rules and policies while Connick’s office decided whether and 
how to charge them.332  
  
 326 Id. at 128-30. 
 327 Id. (citing Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 30-36 (2002)); id. at 186-87 (anticipating opportunities for increasing 
“‘external’ transparency” through internal agency data collection and assessment). 
 328 REINHOLD NEIBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1958); Wright & 
Miller, supra note 29, at 59 (“New Orleans would probably not appear at the top of 
most lists of progressive criminal justice systems.”). 
 329 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Only 
someone who has worked in the field of law enforcement can fully appreciate the vast 
power and the immense discretion that are placed in the hands of a prosecutor with 
respect to the objects of his investigation.”); Erik J. Luna & Marianne Wade, 
Prosecutorial Power: A Transnational Symposium: Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2010) (“In many (if not most) American jurisdictions, the 
prosecutor is the criminal justice system. For all intents and purposes, he makes the 
law, enforces it against particular individuals, and adjudicates their guilt and resulting 
sentences.”); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial 
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009) (“No government official in America 
has as much unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor.”); William J. Stuntz, 
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001) (“[L]aw 
enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison and for how long.”); see generally 
DAVIS, supra note 109.  
 330 Miller & Wright, supra note 29, at 155, 193-95; see also Janet Moore, 
Causes, Consequences, and Cures of Racial and Ethnic Disproportionality in Conviction 
and Incarceration Rates, 3 FREEDOM CTR. J. 35 (2011) (introducing and moderating 
panel discussion with Wayne McKenzie, founding Director of the Prosecution & Racial 
Justice Program at the Vera Institute of Justice). 
 331 Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2057 (2006). 
 332 Louisiana’s pretrial procedural rules and local public defender policies 
contributed to the problem. Pamela R. Metzger, Doing Katrina Time, 81 TUL. L. REV. 
1175, 1177-79 (2007). 
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Moreover, it was during Connick’s nearly thirty-year 
tenure as District Attorney of Orleans Parish that John 
Thompson became one of several prisoners, including other 
death row inmates, whose cases were tainted by Brady 
violations. Until Thompson’s case was decided, Kyles v. 
Whitley333 was the leading national exemplar of Brady 
violations. This was due in part to the sheer scope of the 
“blatant and repeated” due process discovery violations by 
prosecutors in Connick’s office.334 More recently, the Court held 
that the latest Brady violation from Orleans Parish required a 
new trial on quintuple-murder charges for a due process 
violation that at least one Justice considered so egregious as to 
warrant asking the prosecutor during oral argument whether 
she had considered forfeiting the case.335  
To be clear, Miller and Wright offer no imprimatur for 
Connick’s leadership beyond the commitment to data collection 
for charge-screening purposes.336 They do argue, however, that 
Orleans Parish exemplifies, with respect to the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, how “internal regulation can deliver 
even more than advocates of external regulation could hope to 
achieve.”337 Legislators and judges, they explain, “have never 
answered the calls” for reform, “and the political dynamics of 
American criminal justice make it very unlikely that they will 
do so in the future.”338 
At first glance, the Supreme Court’s constriction of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 as a mechanism for enforcing prosecutorial 
disclosure duties in Connick v. Thompson and Garcetti v. 
Ceballos would seem to support this thesis. Nor are Miller and 
Wright alone in promoting a “physician, heal thyself” strategy 
for reform of discretionary prosecutorial decision making. 
Stephanos Bibas agrees that interbranch regulation and 
professional disciplinary oversight comprise a generally 
“ineffectual” check on prosecutorial power and joins those who 
  
 333 514 U.S. 419 (1995).  
 334 Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring); see supra notes 98-100 and 
accompanying text.  
 335 See supra note 24. 
 336 Miller & Wright, supra note 29, at 129-33.  
 337 Id. at 128-29. 
 338 Id. at 165-66 & nn.104-07 (citing “dynamics of prosecutor elections”); see 
also William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969 (2008); William J. 
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006); 
Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; 
Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089-92 (1993).  
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offer managerial blueprints for internal agency reform.339 A 
recent gathering of scholars and practitioners on criminal 
discovery reform also focused on prosecutors’ internal policy 
development as the optimal solution for the improper 
nondisclosure of information beneficial to the defense.340 For 
example, a working group charged with assessing disclosure 
processes assumed that “prosecutors will disclose appropriate 
information to the defense” and left the issue of nondisclosure 
“as a matter for discussion by other Working Groups.”341 The 
“Systems and Culture” group could not even reach consensus 
on training prosecutors to disclose “favorable” as opposed to 
“material” evidence.342  
The reticence of courts and scholars vis-à-vis external 
regulation of prosecutorial disclosure duties is unsurprising. 
Federalism and separation of powers concerns inhibit external 
oversight of criminal justice systems. And as a general 
statement of realpolitik it is certainly true, as the late William 
Stuntz and many others have noted, that the disproportionate 
impact of crime and criminal justice processes on low-income 
people and people of color is simultaneously a cause and a 
consequence of these systems’ resistance to reform through the 
traditional avenues of litigation and legislation.343  
Deference to prosecutorial agencies with respect to the 
vindication of defense discovery rights is also consistent with 
the unprecedented concentration of unchecked power in the 
prosecutorial function.344 From Brady’s inception onward, 
  
 339 Bibas, supra note 329, at 978.  
 340 Ellen Yaroshevsky, Foreword: New Perspectives on Brady and Other 
Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943, 1953-59 (2010) 
(summarizing reports); see also Wright, supra note 104, at 1995-2010; Ronald F. 
Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587 (2010) (comparing U.S. and civil law systems).  
 341 Keith A. Findley, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure 
Obligations: Report of the Working Group on Best Practices: The Disclosure Process, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1972 (2010). 
 342 Wright, supra note 104, at 1998. 
 343 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010); AFTER THE WAR ON 
CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION (Mary Louise Frampton, Ian 
Haney Lopez, & Jonathan Simon eds., 2008); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH 
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A 
CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); James Forman, Jr., Acknowledging Race in a “Post-Racial” 
Era: The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 791 
(2011) (noting need to disaggregate race and class effects); Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 
supra note 338 (attributing disproportionalities in part to decline in local democracy); 
Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug and Crime Control 
Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1, 7-40 (2008) (compiling data, testing 
explanations, and proposing provision of racial impact statements to accompany 
criminal legislation).  
 344 See supra note 329. 
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constitutional doctrine has prioritized deference to 
prosecutorial discretion over enforceability. Case after case 
underscores the weakness of Brady-line authorities as 
enforceable mechanisms for criminal discovery reform and the 
prevention of wrongful convictions. In this context, Connick 
and Garcetti comprise the most recent illustration of the 
doctrinal subordination of prosecutorial disclosure duties, the 
related due process and fair trial rights of defendants, and the 
broader interests of criminal justice stakeholders in convictions 
and sentences that are worthy of confidence.  
B. The Birth of Reform and the Presumptuousness of Despair 
Connick and Garcetti could be taken as more evidence 
(if any were needed) justifying despair of litigation and 
legislation as effective strategies for criminal justice reform, 
particularly in the context of prosecutors’ discovery duties. 
That despair might deepen in light of the stalled progress on 
federal legislation designed to restore some of the protections 
taken from government employees by Garcetti.345 The ironic 
death of that legislation by the secret vote of a single senator346 
might seem to undercut the thesis that law and politics remain 
vibrant and quintessentially democratic avenues toward 
criminal justice reform.  
But unpacking the Connick-Garcetti interplay should 
encourage reformers, despite losses on the litigation and 
legislation fronts, to recover subordinated core meanings of 
relevant rights and duties and to seek new avenues for their 
vindication.347 I view the cases as holding this potential, 
perhaps because capital litigation taught me that despair is 
nearly always presumptuous. Certainly Connick and Garcetti 
illustrate Brady’s complexity and weak enforceability. But the 
cases also highlight the contrasting fairness, finality, and 
efficiency that can be obtained through full open file discovery 
  
 345 The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2010, S. 372, 111th Cong. 
(2010) passed unanimously by the House and Senate only to be derailed by a single 
anonymous “hold” vote. Tom Devine, Op-Ed., Who Killed the Whistle-blower Bill, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/10/opinion/la-oe-devine-
whistleblower-20110110; Lobel, supra note 291, at 454-55 & nn.133-35 (discussing 
threatened veto of Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, H.R. 985, 110th Cong. 
(2007)); see also Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within 
Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1256-57 (2009) 
(quoting Ceballos’s 2006 testimony before Congress). 
 346 Devine, supra note 345. 
 347 Cf. JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND 
THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA 1-10 (2003). 
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reform. Moreover, it was precisely the type of dogged 
investigation and litigation that led to the Connick and 
Garcetti rulings—and discontent inspired by similar examples 
of the Brady model’s failures—that motivated full open file 
reform. In this broader view, the Connick-Garcetti duo may 
open a new chapter in the reform story. To appreciate that 
possibility, one must consider the irony surrounding the advent 
of full open file discovery statutes.  
Full open file discovery had its genesis in the “tough on 
crime” movement of the late 1990s and the specific desire to 
speed the pace of capital postconviction litigation and 
executions.348 Like states across the country, North Carolina was 
modeling new legislation on the federal Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act.349 During legislative hearings on 
the issue in 1996, members of the defense bar cited Robert 
McDowell’s capital case as an example of the increased efficiency 
that full open file discovery could bring to capital litigation.350  
McDowell, a black man, was convicted of capital murder 
by a North Carolina jury in 1979.351 After his appeal was 
denied,352 his lawyers learned that the prosecution had failed to 
disclose evidence at trial that indicated, among other things, 
that the assailant was white.353 The dogged investigation and 
litigation of McDowell’s Brady claim included multiple rounds 
of petitions for review to the United States Supreme Court.354 
In 1990, after eleven years of court proceedings,355 McDowell 
  
 348 Mosteller, supra note 5, at 262-64.  
 349 Email communications with Staples Hughes, N.C. Appellate Defender; 
Malcolm “Tye” Hunter, Dir., Ctr. for Death Penalty Litig., Durham, N.C.; and Robert 
Mosteller (on file with the author). I served as an Assistant Appellate Defender under 
the leadership of Hunter and Hughes, respectively, between 1998 and 2005. 
 350 Id.  
 351 State v. McDowell, 271 S.E.2d 286, 289 (N.C. 1981). 
 352 Id. 
 353 McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945, 947 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 354 Dixon v. McDowell, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989); McDowell v. North Carolina, 451 
U.S. 1012 (1981); McDowell v. North Carolina, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981). 
 355 Upon discovering the Brady information, postconviction counsel filed a 
motion seeking a new trial. After a hearing, the trial judge granted the motion. State v. 
McDowell, 310 S.E.2d 301, 303-05 (N.C. 1984). The state Supreme Court reversed. Id. 
at 303. On federal habeas, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
ordered relief on that claim. Dixon, 858 F.2d at 951. Although McDowell’s case appears 
to be missing from a 2006 assessment of Fourth Circuit habeas decisions, he is among a 
small minority of petitioners to prevail in a Circuit whose rates of habeas relief are 
“significantly lower than in any other circuit.” Sheri Lynn Johnson, Wishing Petitioners 
to Death: Factual Misrepresentations in Fourth Circuit Capital Cases, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1105, 1150-51 & nn.373-79 (2006).  
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received a new trial and a conviction on the lesser, noncapital 
charge of second-degree murder.356 
Thus, full open file discovery reform began as a political 
compromise inspired by protracted litigation over due process 
disclosure duties. A coalition (or at least a collection) of odd 
bedfellows designed full open file reform in part to reduce the 
wasted resources and uncertainty created in cases like Robert 
McDowell’s by nondisclosure of Brady evidence to the defense. 
The new open file statute “changed the landscape” of capital 
postconviction litigation.357 As discussed below, the state courts 
rejected the few challenges that prosecutors raised in the early 
phases of implementation. Instead, the legislature addressed 
prosecutors’ concerns by amending the statutes. And the 
general trajectory of the amendments has been toward 
expanding and strengthening open file rights and duties.  
C. Full Open File Reform in Action: Case Law, Legislative 
History, and a View from the Trenches 
The state Supreme Court issued the first significant 
interpretation of the 1996 full open file discovery statute within 
two years of enactment. The state had sought to restrict the 
law’s scope by labeling the bulk of the prosecution’s file “work 
product.”358 The Court applied the law’s plain language and 
rejected the state’s argument.359 Then compliance with the 1996 
statute revealed Brady violations in a series of capital cases. 
The state courts vacated judgments in ten of those cases.360 
That litigation focused attention on noncompliance with Brady 
discovery duties and the resulting burdens on courts, victims’ 
  
 356 McDowell received a life sentence. Persons Removed from Death Row Since 
North Carolina’s Death Penalty Was Reinstated in 1977, N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 
http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/deathpenalty/removed.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 357 Mosteller, supra note 5, at 263. 
 358 Id. at 263 & n.17 (citing State v. Bates, 497 S.E.2d 276, 280 (N.C. 1998)). 
 359 Bates, 497 S.E.2d at 280-82. 
 360 Mosteller, supra note 5, at 261 & n.11 (citing cases). Brady claims led to 
new trials in these cases only after significant expenditure of time and resources on 
direct appeal, during which the office of the state Attorney General represented the 
prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Gell, 524 S.E.2d 332 (N.C. 2000) (new trial awarded on 
post-conviction Motion for Appropriate Relief, Bertie County Superior Court Docket 
No. 95 CRS 1884, Dec. 9, 2002); State v. Hamilton, 519 S.E.2d 514 (N.C. 1999) (same, 
Richmond County Superior Court Docket No. 95 CRS 1670, Apr. 23, 2003); State v. 
Hoffman, 505 S.E.2d 80 (N.C. 1998) (same, Union County Superior Court Docket No. 
95 CRS 15695, Apr. 30, 2004); State v. Bishop, 472 S.E.2d 842 (N.C. 1996) (same, 
Guilford County Superior Court Docket Nos. 93 CRS 20410-20423, Jan. 10, 2000); 
State v. Womble, 473 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. 1996) (same, Columbus County Superior Court 
Docket Nos. 93 CRS 1992-1993).  
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families, taxpayers, defendants, and public confidence in the 
criminal justice system.  
By this point, about half of the state prosecutors had 
implemented some form of open file discovery.361 Subsequent 
media coverage and public pressure led to the first major 
expansion of the 1996 full open file statute in 2004.362 That 
amendment created the broadest criminal discovery rights and 
duties in the nation.363 As discussed below, subsequent 
amendments in 2007 and 2011 continued the trajectory toward 
increasingly expansive and enforceable discovery duties.  
The 2004 statute extended discovery duties beyond the 
postconviction phase, requiring the prosecution in all felony 
cases to provide the defense, before trial, with “the complete files 
of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the 
investigation . . . or prosecution” of the case.364 File was defined 
expansively as well, to include all statements by defendants, 
codefendants, and witnesses, all investigative notes, all test or 
examination results, and “any other matter or evidence obtained 
during the investigation” of the case.365 Crucially, the statute 
mandated that “[o]ral statements shall be in written or recorded 
form”366 and shielded prosecutors’ interview notes from 
disclosure as work product only “to the extent they contain the 
opinions, theories, strategies or conclusions” of the prosecutor or 
other legal staff.367 Another provision allowed both prosecution 
and defense to move ex parte for protective orders to prevent 
disclosures that create “a substantial risk to any person of 
physical harm, intimidation, bribery, economic reprisals, or 
unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment.”368 
In April 2007, the state’s intermediate court of appeals 
interpreted the crucial provision requiring recordation and 
disclosure of all oral statements. As was the case with the 1996 
  
 361 Telephone Interview with Kimberly Overton, Chief Resource Prosecutor, 
N.C. Conference of District Attorneys (Aug. 17, 2011). 
 362 Mosteller, supra note 5, at 264-76. Discontent over the perceived mildness 
of sanctions for nondisclosure also led to expanded duties under the governing 
disciplinary rules. Id. 
 363 Id. at 274-76. 
 364 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2004). 
 365 Id. 
 366 Id. 
 367 Id. § 15A-904(a). 
 368 Id. § 15A-908(a). The new provision for ex parte protective orders required 
notice to opposing counsel of the order’s existence, but “without disclosure of the 
subject matter.” Id. A subsequent amendment requires any “affidavits or statements” 
supporting such an ex parte order to be sealed for appellate review. N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 15A-908(b) (2012). 
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discovery statute, the Court again held that the legislature 
meant what it said: “The plain, unambiguous meaning of this 
requirement is that ‘statements’ need not be signed or adopted 
before being subject to discovery.”369 The panel majority also 
rejected the state’s objection that the requirement to reveal all 
recorded witness statements trenched too far upon work 
product privileges. The Court held that the amendment 
adequately protects prosecutors’ “mental processes while 
allowing the defendants access to factual information collected 
by the state.”370  
Like the state courts, the legislature also rejected an 
attempt by prosecutors to expand the work-product privilege in 
the discovery reform statutes.371 But prosecutors did obtain 
amendments addressing other concerns. At the prosecutors’ 
request, protections were added to shield personal identifying 
information and, more specifically, to protect identities of 
confidential informants.372 The legislature also eased 
requirements for recording witness statements to prevent 
redundancies.373 
Other amendments responded to a DNA laboratory’s 
failure to reveal exculpatory information in the Duke lacrosse 
  
 369 State v. Shannon, 642 S.E.2d 516, 523 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).  
 370 Id. at 525 n.2 (quoting John Rubin, N.C. Inst. of Gov’t, Administration of 
Justice, BULL. 2004/06, at 8); State v. Hardy, 235 S.E.2d 828, 841 (N.C. 1977) (“Only 
roughly and broadly speaking can a statement of a witness that is reduced verbatim to 
a writing or a recording by an attorney be considered work product, if at all . . . . Such a 
statement is not work product in the same sense that an attorney’s impressions, 
opinions, and conclusions or his legal theories and strategies are work product.”).  
 371 The General Assembly rejected a 2007 amendment that would have reduced 
prosecutors’ duty to disclose interview notes. Compare N.C.S.B. 1009, 2007 Gen. Assemb. 
(N.C. Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2007/Bills/Senate/ 
PDF/S1009v1.pdf, with Act of Aug. 19, 2007, § 15A-904(a), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 377 § 2, 
available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2007/Bills/Senate/PDF/S1009v4.pdf. The 
legislature also rejected a 2011 amendment to limit prosecutors’ disclosure duties to their 
own files as opposed to all investigative materials held by all agencies involved in the case. 
Compare N.C.H.B. 408, 2011 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. Mar. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2011/Bills/House/PDF/H408v1.pdf, with N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2012). 
 372 § 15A-904(a)(1)-(2), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 377 § 2. These protections were 
later expanded to include specific categories of confidential informants and victim 
impact statements. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-904(a3)-(a4) (2012). 
 373 § 15A-903(a)(1), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 377 § 1. The amendment eliminated 
the recordation requirement when prosecutors interview a witness without a third 
party present unless the witness says something “significantly new or different” from 
prior recorded statements. Id. The Shannon dissent had noted the inefficiencies 
resulting from the previous double-recordation requirement. 642 S.E.2d at 524, 526 
(McCullough, J., dissenting in part). After obtaining agreement on the 2007 
amendments, the state dropped its appeal of the Shannon majority’s decision. State v. 
Shannon, 654 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. 2007). 
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cases374 and to new concerns raised by both prosecutors and 
defense lawyers. Prosecutors protested that unwarranted 
disciplinary charges were being filed against them when other 
agencies hindered compliance by failing to give prosecutors the 
information they needed to satisfy their discovery duties.375 In 
response, the legislature redefined the term prosecutorial 
agencies to accommodate prosecutors’ limited ability to 
sanction nondisclosure by investigators. But the amendments 
also expanded the statutes’ scope. Agencies was redefined to 
include “any public or private entity that obtains information 
on behalf of a law enforcement agency or prosecutor’s office in 
connection with the investigation . . . or prosecution” of a 
case.376 The legislature also clarified that all testing data must 
be disclosed, “including, but not limited to, preliminary tests or 
screening results and bench notes.”377 
In addition, these recent amendments tightened the 
mandate for disclosure by law enforcement or other 
investigative agencies of the complete investigative file to the 
prosecution.378 The legislature added criminal penalties for 
willful noncompliance with disclosure duties by investigative 
agencies.379 Finally, the revised statutes require that a 
prosecutor’s “reasonably diligent inquiry” to comply with 
disclosure duties triggers a presumption that he or she acted in 
good faith.380 The Governor signed these amendments into law 
on June 23, 2011.381 
The well-known Duke lacrosse case demonstrates that 
full open file discovery is a prerequisite—a necessary, if not a 
sufficient, condition—for preventing Brady violations as well as 
the wasteful litigation and wrongful prosecutions and 
  
 374 See Mosteller, supra note 5, at 285-306. 
 375 See N.C. H.B. 408, Bill Tracking Report, 2011 Bill Tracking N.C. H.B. 408, 
[hereinafter H.B. 408 Bill Tracking Report] (bill “avoids frivolous claims of professional 
misconduct against prosecutors”); see also Telephone Interview with Brad Bannon, N.C. 
Advocates for Justice (June 27, 2011); Telephone Interviews with Professors Jim 
Drennan, Jeff Welty, and Jessica Smith, N.C. Sch. of Gov’t (July 27, 2011; July 31, 
2011; and Aug. 1, 2011, respectively); Telephone Interview with Kimberly Overton, 
supra note 361. 
 376 Act of June 23, 2011, § 15A-903(a)(1)(c), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 250, § 1, 
available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2011/Bills/House/PDF/H408v5.pdf. 
 377 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1)(a) (2012). 
 378 Compare Act of July 5, 2007, § 15A-903(c), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 183, § 1, 
available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2007/Bills/House/PDF/H786v5.pdf 
(requiring disclosure upon request by the State), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 903(c) (mandating 
timely disclosure without request). 
 379 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(d).  
 380 Id. § 15A-910(c)-(d). 
 381 H.B. 408 Bill Tracking Report, supra note 375. 
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convictions that can ensue.382 Additional evidence of full open 
file discovery’s success includes the rarity of court challenges or 
other significant litigation arising from the statutes in the 
reported cases; the judiciary’s plain-language resolution of 
those claims; and the legislature’s accommodation of 
prosecutors’ concerns as they arise while maintaining and 
strengthening full open file rights and duties.  
Observations from those involved with training and 
implementation indicate that after initial resistance, primarily 
from some of the more experienced prosecutors and law 
enforcement officers, full open file reform is finding increasingly 
broad acceptance.383 Under the statutes, responsibility for 
identifying materially beneficial information is where it 
belongs—with defense counsel. Full open file discovery appears 
to be increasing the speed and fairness of plea bargaining.384 An 
initial surge in pretrial protective orders subsided with 
amendments shielding victims and witnesses from inappropriate 
exposure or interference.385 Some jurisdictions have seen 
increased pretrial discovery hearings, mainly in high-level cases, 
as the parties document good-faith efforts to comply with their 
statutory duties.386 Issues regarding appropriate sanctions for 
discovery violations by both sides are being resolved through 
the normal course of trial rulings and appellate review.387  
On the other hand, logistical problems with discovery 
production have been significant, particularly in major cases 
with deep investigative histories. Some of these concerns are 
being addressed through training on best practices and 
through development of an electronic compliance program.388 
This Discovery Automated System, when fully operational, will 
be used by investigative agencies, prosecutors, and defenders, 
respectively, to record, organize, and receive information. 
Every action in a case will be recorded, and date-stamped. Such 
  
 382 Mosteller, supra note 5, at 276-309. 
 383 Telephone Interviews with Brad Bannon and Professors Jim Drennan, Jeff 
Welty, and Jessica Smith, supra note 375; Telephone Interview with Kimberly 
Overton, supra note 361.  
 384 See sources cited supra note 383.  
 385 See sources cited supra note 383. 
 386 See sources cited supra note 383. 
 387 JESSICA SMITH, CRIMINAL CASE COMPENDIUM 25-27 (University of North 
Carolina Institute of Government, Aug. 2, 2011) (collecting cases), available at 
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/Criminal%20Case%20Compendium
%20November%202008%20to%20present.pdf.  
 388 See sources cited supra note 383. 
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recordation will include any redactions or edits made to any of 
the information contained in the file.389  
Certainly there remain key sticking points for successful 
implementation of full open file reform. Thousands of new and 
experienced investigators must be trained. These front-line 
justice system personnel range from law enforcement officers to 
employees in the state Department of Social Services. Nor will 
it suffice merely to train these key stakeholders on the scope 
and meaning of full open file rights and duties. Investigators 
also must have adequate resources to comply with recordation 
and reporting requirements. Finally, as Daniel Medwed, 
R. Michael Cassidy, and other scholars have noted, full open file 
discovery is not a cure-all.390 The recent removal of Durham, 
North Carolina District Attorney Tracy Cline from office was 
due in part to discovery violations that underscore the 
recalcitrance of some agency cultures, and of corresponding 
enforceability problems, related to prosecutors’ discovery 
duties.391 Nevertheless, when compliance can be enforced 
through criminal penalties, and when robust opportunities for 
defense investigation and litigation at the trial, appellate, and 
postconviction stages create a meaningful opportunity to prevent 
or promptly detect and correct discovery violations, the full open 
file model is the best option for improving efficiency, reliability, 
and fairness in criminal adjudications. 
D. Research and Reform Opportunities for the Future 
Although much work remains to be done to improve 
compliance with criminal discovery obligations, the readily 
available empirical evidence highlights significant steps toward 
successful implementation of full open file discovery as a reform 
model. The history of full open file reform also demonstrates the 
  
 389 See sources cited supra note 383. 
 390 Cassidy, supra note 37, at 1477; Medwed, supra note 98, at 1557-66. 
 391 Cline replaced Michael Nifong, the prosecutor in the Duke lacrosse cases. J. 
Andrew Curliss, Judge Takes Cline to Task, NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Nov. 15, 2011, 4:08 AM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/11/15/1645167/judge-takes-cline-to-task.html. Cline’s 
subsequent suspension and removal were triggered under a seldom-used state statute, N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 7A-66 (2011). J. Andrew Curliss, Cline Inquiry Hangs on “Elastic” Law, 
NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Feb. 12, 2012, 3:38 AM), http://www.newsobserver.com/ 
2012/02/12/1847876/cline-inquiry-hangs-on-elastic.html; Group Claims Durham DA 
Unfairly Removed From Office, NEWSRECORD.COM (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.news-
record.com/content/2012/03/21/article/group_claims_durham_da_unfairly_removed_from_off
ice; see also In re Hudson, 600 S.E.2d 25, 27-28 (N.C. 2004) (affirming order dismissing 
removal petition and sanctioning party moving for prosecutor’s removal); In re Spivey, 480 
S.E.2d 693, 701 (N.C. 1997) (rejecting prosecutor’s challenge to statute based on state 
constitutional separation of powers grounds). 
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continued vitality of litigation and legislation as necessary 
complements to internal agency reform in the context of 
discretionary prosecutorial decision making. Additional research 
should test for any influence of full open file discovery reform on 
plea and conviction rates and pretrial or postconviction 
litigation over discovery issues. Further research should also 
identify the conditions that foster such reform in some 
jurisdictions and impede it in others. With respect to North 
Carolina’s expansion of full open file discovery from capital 
postconviction cases to all felonies, Professor Mosteller 
summarizes the accomplishment in half-a-dozen words: “The 
adversaries hammered out a deal.”392  
That statement raises interesting questions. What 
conditions enabled the defense function, whose efficacy is often 
strongly discounted,393 to come to the negotiating table as a 
meaningful adversary to the prosecution? How might those 
conditions be duplicated in other jurisdictions? To what extent 
did the adversaries channel the interests of the 
disproportionately low income and minority individuals who 
bear the brunt of crime and criminal proceedings, but who, 
according to popular wisdom, are excluded from meaningful 
participation in the development of criminal justice policy?394 
What conditions enable those same individuals to ask their 
own policy questions, build their own coalitions and advocate 
for their own solutions to what are too often perceived as 
“criminal injustice systems”?395 
Answering such questions could help move justice 
systems more quickly toward greater fairness and finality in 
criminal adjudications. With respect to the most recent set of 
full open file amendments, key negotiators for the prosecution 
and the defense concur that two skills were essential to 
successful resolution of the issues. First, the negotiators were 
able to defuse emotions inherent in the highly adversarial 
prosecutor-defender relationship.396 Second, they were able to 
listen closely to opposing views to detect and address the core 
concerns being brought to the table.397 Combining those 
  
 392 Mosteller, supra note 5, at 272 & n.76. 
 393 See generally CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 113. 
 394 See supra note 343 and accompanying text.  
 395 Judge Weinstein captured the reality behind this epithet with passionate 
precision in United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 660 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 396 Telephone Interviews with Brad Bannon and Professors Jim Drennan, Jeff 
Welty, and Jessica Smith, supra note 375; Telephone Interview with Kimberly 
Overton, supra note 361. 
 397 Id.  
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capacities allowed negotiators to tailor solutions to the specific 
problems at issue, and to build trust essential to the resolution 
of future problems.398 As I have discussed in a different 
doctrinal context, such capacities are central to the exercise of 
moral imagination within a discourse model of political 
ethics.399 Ideally, they will be brought to bear at the national 
level, through exploration of the full open file statutes as a 
model for a uniform criminal discovery code encompassing 
misdemeanors as well as felonies.400 
In the absence of such conditions, other “carrot-and-
stick” options might be considered. The “stick” component could 
emulate federal legislation adopted after the Rampart police 
misconduct scandal exploded in Los Angeles. In response, 
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which opened the door for 
Department of Justice oversight of local police reform efforts 
initiated through litigation.401 Ironically, it was in the context of 
public outrage over the Rampart scandal that Richard Ceballos 
felt bound to report evidence of officer perjury in the Cuskey 
and Longoria cases.402 Similar outrage over injustices and 
inefficiencies caused by Brady’s weak enforceability might lead 
to comparable legislation, oversight, and reform in the arena of 
prosecutorial disclosure duties. Reform advocates also might 
seek to tie the receipt of federal and other grant funding to the 
achievement of benchmarks in progress toward full open file 
reform. The “carrot” approach to reform has some track record 
of success in the context of policing, and might translate well in 
bringing appropriate levels of transparency and accountability 
to discretionary prosecutorial decision making.403  
  
 398 Id. 
 399 See generally Janet Moore, Covenant and Feminist Reconstructions of 
Subjectivity Within Theories of Justice, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (1992). 
 400 See supra note 30. 
 401 Chemerinsky, supra note 226, at 589-97; Kami Chavis Simmons, The 
Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local 
Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 507-11 (2008). 
 402 See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. 
 403 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN D. SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL 
CRIME POLICY AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, 1968-78, at 4 
(1980) (noting that legislation that created LEAA adopted a block grant approach, in 
which fighting crime would remain a state and local function, and federal government’s 
primary role would be to provide revenues and ideas allowing states to develop 
programs for their own use); NANCY E. MARION, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL CRIME 
CONTROL INITIATIVES, 1960-93, at 56-58 (1994) (noting LEAA’s block grant design was 
supported by Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress, who felt that federal 
government should not involve itself directly in local police efforts); Paul Hoffman, The 
Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police 
Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1530-31 nn.296-97 (1993) (urging 
conditional grants of federal funds to curb police misconduct). 
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CONCLUSION 
The implementation and expansion of full open file 
discovery provides two object lessons. First, the model’s 
successes to date offer lessons for jurisdictions seeking greater 
fairness, finality, and efficiency in criminal case outcomes. 
Second, full open file reform demonstrates the continued 
vitality of law and politics as effective and quintessentially 
democratic tools for opening the black boxes that nest 
throughout the nation’s criminal justice systems. Connick and 
Garcetti can introduce an important new chapter in this reform 
process. The cases simultaneously underscore the weak 
enforceability of prosecutors’ due process disclosure duties and 
highlight the benefits of the full open file discovery model.  
The core question animating this work is a search for 
sustainable production of the conditions that allow jurisdictions 
to pursue, through the traditional clash of law and politics as 
necessary complements to internal agency reform, significant 
“smart on crime” improvements such as full open file discovery. 
For example, Miller and Wright correctly stress the critical role 
of internal data gathering and assessment in identifying and 
correcting race effects on prosecutorial decision making.404 Yet 
it was zealous litigation and aggressive, grassroots-to-grasstops 
political advocacy that led to enactment of the nation’s first 
Racial Justice Act, allowing death row inmates to challenge 
death sentences based on statistical evidence of unconscious 
racial bias in charging, sentencing, and jury selection.405 
Litigation and policy advocacy also has motivated key indigent 
defense reforms, including the creation of politically 
independent oversight bodies with the authority to promulgate 
and enforce standards for attorney qualification, training, and 
  
 404 Miller & Wright, supra note 29, at 195. 
 405 North Carolina Racial Justice Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010 to -2012 
(2012). On April 20, 2012, Judge Gregory Weeks ordered relief in the first case litigated 
under the Racial Justice Act. State v. Robinson, No. 91-CrS-23143 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Apr. 20, 2012). Two months later the legislature overrode a gubernatorial veto and 
repealed significant provisions of the Act. An Act to Amend Death Penalty Procedure, 
2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, §§ 2-9, (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-
2004(b), 15A-2011 to -2012. For an analysis of the legal and political history that led to 
the Racial Justice Act, see generally Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial 
Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 
88 N.C. L. REV. 2031 (2010); for analysis of the statutes’ application, see Robert P. 
Mosteller, Responding to McCleskey and the Defects of Batson: North Carolina Racial 
Justice Act Addresses the Systemic Pattern of Race Based Peremptory Challenges in 
Death Sentences, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2012).  
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performance.406 In a like vein, crises in state and local budgets 
have led legislatures to accompany new criminal justice 
statutes with fiscal note and racial impact assessment 
requirements. Such benchmarks can help check the massive 
and virtually unregulated investment of increasingly scarce tax 
dollars407 in what too often becomes a rapidly-spinning set of 
revolving doors into and out of local, state, and national 
criminal justice systems.408 
The complementary nature of bureaucracy, law, and 
politics warrants more scholarly analysis at these and other 
pivot points in the discretionary decision making that drives 
criminal justice systems. Legal scholars can enrich the analysis 
through interdisciplinary cooperation with specialists in 
criminology, sociology, political science, public health, and 
social work. Inter-institutional partnerships between the legal 
academy and government, nonprofit agencies, and foundations 
may yield more effective, sustainable system improvements.  
Such engaged scholarship may also offer an antidote for 
despair over the possibility of truly democratic criminal justice 
reform. This is the political black box that can tempt scholars 
to privilege internal administrative reform over law and 
politics in the quest for criminal justice reform. Engaged 
scholarship may be able to empower the disproportionately 
low-income and minority members of our communities—those 
whose lives most often intersect with criminal justice systems, 
but who seldom have an effective voice in shaping policy and 
procedure—to pose their own research questions, formulate 
their own reform proposals, and create their own policy 
advocacy coalitions. Their voices are crucial to sustaining the 
quest for greater transparency and accountability in criminal 
justice decision making. 
  
 406 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-102 (2005); Bruce A. Green, Criminal 
Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1183 & 
n.65 (2003) (citing Montana litigation).  
 407 See STEVE AOS ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, EVIDENCE-
BASED PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME RATES (2006); Catherine London, Racial Impact 
Statements: A Proactive Approach to Addressing Racial Disparities in Prison 
Populations, 29 LAW & INEQ. 211, 231-33 & nn.178-91 (2011) (describing effects of 
fiscal and racial impact note requirements).  
 408 See generally Alexander, supra note 343. 
